Appeal by defendants from Lee, Judge. Summary judgment for plaintiff entered 6 January 1981 in Superior Court, Wake County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 20 October 1981.
Hill, Judge. Judges Vaughn and Whichard concur.
On 25 May 1955, the Wake County Board of Commissioners [hereinafter referred to as the Commissioners] followed the recommendation of a "hospital survey" ordered by them in 1954 and created the Wake County Hospital Authority [hereinafter referred to as the Authority]. One county commissioner and six other citizens were named to the board of trustees of the Authority. By resolution on 18 July 1955, the Commissioners vested in the Authority "duties and powers for the planning, establishment, construction, maintenance and operation of a county hospital . . . ." The Commissioners further resolved that they would have the power to remove any member of the Authority for misconduct "or for other causes which in the sound discretion of the board renders such member as unfit or disqualified to serve." Also, the county treasurer would have custody of "all funds of the hospital . . . and establish and maintain an accounting system in such manner as to give a true and accurate accounting of all the financial transactions of the hospital and clinics." The Authority, however, would retain control over the expenditures of moneys collected through the operation of its hospitals and clinics. In addition,
the Authority would have the power to adopt its own by-laws and to select and hire all necessary employees and assistants. Significantly, the resolution states that "[t]he Hospital shall be operated at all times, and in every respect administered as a charitable, non-profit hospital; no part of the net earnings of the Hospital shall ever inure to the benefit of any individual, firm, corporation or private shareholder." Further, title to all property for hospital purposes would be vested in the County, although the Authority could purchase necessary equipment. The Commissioners also placed certain fiscal limitations upon the Authority: (1) that the Commissioners review and approve the annual budget of the Authority; (2) that the Authority not borrow money, undertake additional programs, or other expenditures without the approval of the Commissioners; and (3) that a representative of the Commissioners be permitted to attend meetings, review the Authority's records, and make audits necessary in connection with indigent's records.
On 7 June 1965, the Commissioners unanimously approved a resolution adopted by the Authority "to convert Wake Memorial Hospital to a non-profit corporation." Three months later the Commissioners officially approved the articles of incorporation of the System, a lease agreement between the county and the System, and an agreement between the county and the System for the care and treatment of indigent patients.
The System's articles of incorporation, filed 9 September 1965, provide, as did the Commissioners' resolutions creating the Authority, that "[t]he corporation shall not have and issue capital stock and shall be operated without profit to the members or their successors, and no part of the net earnings shall inure, or may lawfully inure, to the benefit of any member or individual." Further, in the event of dissolution of the corporation, "all of its moneys, properties, and other assets" would be donated, transferred and delivered to the county to be used by the county "exclusively for the accomplishments of the purposes for which the corporation is formed." The articles of incorporation also provide that all vacancies in the membership of the System's board of directors would be "subject to the approval of the Board of County Commissioners of Wake County . . . ."
The lease agreement entered into by the county and the System on 7 September 1965 provided for a renewable five-year
term; the annual rental was $1.00 per year during the term. The county also placed certain fiscal limitations upon the System very similar to limitations placed upon the Authority by the Commissioners: (1) that the Commissioners review and approve the annual budget of the System; (2) that the System make its records available to an independent auditor mutually satisfactory to the county and the System; (3) that a representative of the county be permitted to attend meetings, review the System's records, and make audits necessary in connection with indigents' records; (4) that the System file with the county a schedule of its charges and rates; and (5) that the System operate its facilities in accordance with standard practices for operating hospitals in North Carolina. The System was operated under this lease agreement until 1 January 1975.
On 1 January 1975, the System became subject to an operating agreement entered into by it and the county. Included in the agreement was a bond order authorizing the issuance of $34,775,000 in revenue bonds which were identified as "Bonds of the County." Pursuant to the bond order, the System agreed to collect revenues for deposit to the revenue fund which "constitute[s] revenues of the County derived from the ownership of the System by the County . . . ." The System further agreed to make its records available to the county and furnish it copies of audited financial statements and additional audits and reports as required by law. Upon the termination of this agreement, in accordance with the amended articles of incorporation, the System agreed to "transfer, assign and convey to the County, without any consideration therefor, any and all moneys, properties and other assets" of the System except as otherwise required by law. The System also agreed that it would not change its corporate existence, nor further amend its articles of incorporation, "without the prior written consent of the County." Finally, the System and the county "understood and agreed that the [System] is an independent contractor and that none of the Trustees, officers, employees or agents of the [System] is or shall be deemed to be an agent or employee of the County by reason of anything contained in this Agreement."
After two and one-half years of operation under the 1975 agreement, the county and the System entered into a new operating agreement on 1 June 1977. Included in this agreement
was another bond order of $41,535,000 adopted by the Commissioners to refund the 1975 revenue bonds. The significant provisions of this operating agreement and the 1975 agreement are substantially the same. At all times it has been the purpose of the System "to provide for the care and maintenance of the indigent sick and afflicted poor of Wake County through the continued assistance of contributions by the County."
On 19 December 1978, three separate civil actions were begun against the System by three medical professional associations -- David Lane Jones, M.D., P.A.; Morton Meltzer, M.D., P.A.; and Cary Family Medicine and Ambulatory Care Center, P.A. -- for alleged wrongful termination of agreements to provide professional services to the System by each plaintiff. Each of the civil actions subsequently was dismissed, and the controversies were concluded by settlements. The newspaper was refused permission by the System to examine and copy its records pertaining to those settlements, and the crux of the case sub judice is whether those records and the expense account records later requested by the newspaper, are public records which must be disclosed under North Carolina's public records statutes. See G.S. 132-1 to -9.
This case is before us on appeal from the trial judge's granting of summary judgment for the newspaper. Summary judgment is proper where "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that any party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." G.S. 1A-1, Rule 56(c). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the trial judge does not decide issues of fact but merely determines whether a genuine issue of fact exists. Vassey v. Burch, 301 N.C. 68, 269 S.E.2d 137 (1980); Singleton v. Stewart, 280 N.C. 460, 186 S.E.2d 400 (1972). "Accordingly, the party moving for summary judgment has the burden of clearly ...