On appeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-30(2) from the decision of a divided panel of the Court of Appeals,
The plaintiff was injured when he bit down on a small bone in a hamburger sandwich purchased at Wendy's Old Fashioned Hamburgers. He brought actions in negligence and breach of the implied warranty of merchantability against Wenco Management, Wenco Foods, Inc., d/b/a Wendy's Old Fashioned Hamburgers [hereinafter Wendy's], and against Greensboro Meat Supply Co. [hereinafter GMSC], which allegedly supplied the hamburger meat for that Wendy's restaurant.
The trial court granted summary judgment on both claims for defendant GMSC, but allowed plaintiff's action against Wendy's to go to trial. At trial, the trial court allowed Wendy's' motion for directed verdict on both claims at the close of plaintiff's evidence.
In its majority opinion as reported the Court of Appeals reversed both the directed verdict for Wendy's and summary judgment for GMSC. A majority of the Court of Appeals panel (Judges Arnold and Greene) concluded that plaintiff's implied warranty of merchantability claims should have survived Wendy's' motion for a directed verdict and GMSC's motion for summary judgment. Only Judge Greene, writing the principal opinion for the panel, concluded that the negligence claims should also have survived these motions by defendants. Only Chief Judge Hedrick concluded that the trial court correctly entered summary judgment for GMSC and directed verdict for Wendy's on both the warranty and negligence claims.
We affirm the Court of Appeals' decision affirming the directed verdict on plaintiff's negligence claim against Wendy's. We affirm the Court of Appeals decision reversing directed verdict for Wendy's and summary judgment for GMSC on plaintiff's breach of the implied warranty of merchantability claims. We conclude, however, that the majority of the Court of Appeals erroneously affirmed summary judgment for GMSC as to plaintiff's negligence claim; we therefore reverse this decision. The result is that the case is remanded for trial on plaintiff's implied warranty of merchantability claims against both defendants and on plaintiff's negligence claim against GMSC.
At trial, only plaintiff offered evidence. Plaintiff testified that on 28 October 1983, he and an employee stopped for lunch at the Hillsborough Wendy's restaurant. Plaintiff ordered a double hamburger and had eaten about half of it when he bit down and felt immediate pain in his lower jaw. Plaintiff took from his mouth the hamburger, a piece of bone that did not come from his mouth, and pieces of teeth. Plaintiff described the piece of bone as triangular, one-sixteenth- to one-quarter-inch thick, one-half-inch long and tapering from one-quarter inch at its base to a point. He indicated that, as far as he knew, the bone was a cow bone. It was about the size of his small fingernail, thick on one side, shaved down to a point on the other, and too small to be flexible. Plaintiff stated the bite containing the bone was mostly meat and that the bone had been in the meat, but he admitted it was possible the bone could have been in any of the condiments or in the bun. Plaintiff's luncheon companion testified he witnessed the incident and saw plaintiff show the bone to the restaurant manager. He noted plaintiff missed at least one day of work. Plaintiff's wife testified as to the extent and intensity of her husband's pain resulting from the broken teeth, and plaintiff's dentist and endodontist testified as to the dental damage, their work on his teeth over several months, and the cost of their services.
Plaintiff also introduced into evidence a copy of Wendy's' grinding specifications for its meat suppliers, which require that chopped meat be "free from bone or cartilage in excess of 1/8 inch in any dimension that is ossified" prior to grinding and packing.
The owner of GMSC, Jake Leggett, called as a witness by plaintiff, testified that in 1983, and at all times relevant to this incident, GMSC supplied all the ground beef to the Wendy's restaurant in Hillsborough. The beef was certified by the United States Department of Agriculture. Leggett submitted as an exhibit U.S.D.A. boneless meat inspection criteria, which included a chart describing criteria for when bone fragments in meat were considered a defect in the product. The chart indicated that bone fragments less than one-and-one-half inches in their greatest dimensions were "minor" defects. Bone fragments less than three-quarters of an inch in length and less than one-quarter inch wide which are flexible or which crumble easily are considered "insignificant."
More than five minor fragments in a sample unit of thirty pounds is considered a "major" defect.
According to Leggett, meat is inspected prior to grinding. During 1983, a state meat inspector was on site at GMSC at all times to inspect, grade, and approve or reject each lot of meat prior to grinding. State supervisory personnel periodically spot-checked behind the inspectors. Inspectors from Wendy's also randomly inspected GMSC and were "very meticulous and strict" in enforcing Wendy's' own regulations. Random inspection, sometimes occurring several times a week, ensured that GMSC effectively enforced these regulations.
In addition, Leggett described the grinding process required by Wendy's regulations and used by GMSC. By this process chopped meat is forced through two plates with progressively smaller holes. A "bone collector" device on GMSC's grinding machine removes much of the bone and gristle remaining after the grinding process. The meat is not inspected after grinding, but is packed in twenty-pound bags, vacuum sealed, and placed in a cooler.
A. IMPLIED WARRANTY OF MERCHANTABILITY
A motion for a directed verdict presents the question whether the evidence is sufficient to carry the case to the jury.
In passing on this motion, the trial Judge must consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant, and conflicts in the evidence together with inferences which may be drawn from it must be resolved in favor of the non-movant. The motion may be granted only if the evidence is insufficient to justify a verdict for the non-movant as a matter of law.
The implied warranty of merchantability as codified under the Uniform Commercial Code, N.C.G.S. § 25-2-314 (1986), accords with prior North Carolina law. Performance Motors, Inc. v. Allen, 280 N.C. 385, 394, 186 S.E.2d 161, 166 (1972). See generally, Jeanne Owen, Note. Sales -- Warranties -- Implied in Sale of Food for Human Consumption, 32 N.C. L. Rev. 351, 354 (1954). The statute states, in pertinent part:
Unless excluded or modified, . . . a warranty that the goods shall be merchantable is implied in a contract for their sale if the seller is a merchant with respect to goods of that kind.
[T]he serving of food or drink to be consumed either on the premises or elsewhere is a sale.
N.C.G.S. § 25-2-314(1) (1986). Goods, to be merchantable, "must be at least such as . . . are fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used." N.C.G.S. § 25-2-314(2), (2)(c) (1986).
To prove a breach of implied warranty of merchantability under N.C.G.S. § 25-2-314, "a plaintiff must prove, first [,] that the goods bought and sold were subject to an implied warranty of merchantability; second, that the goods did not comply with the warranty in that the goods were defective at the time of the sale; third, that his injury was due to the defective nature of the goods; and fourth, that damages were suffered as a result. The burden is upon the purchaser to establish a breach by the seller of the warranty of merchantability by showing that a defect existed at the time of the sale."
Morrison v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 319 N.C. 298, 301, 354 S.E.2d 495, 497 (1987) (quoting Cockerham v. Ward, 44 N.C. App. 615, 624-25, 262 S.E.2d 651, 658, disc. rev. denied, 300 N.C. 195, 269 S.E.2d 622 (1980) (citations omitted).
Wendy's admitted in its answer that it is a seller of food intended for human consumption, that it is engaged in and operates fast food restaurants, including the Hillsborough restaurant where plaintiff was allegedly injured, and that one of the products it sells is hamburgers containing meat patties made of beef products. The Court of Appeals correctly concluded these admissions establish that Wendy's is a merchant and that the foods it sells are subject to the implied warranty of merchantability.
Plaintiff's evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to him, tended to show that his broken teeth and resulting physical and financial damage were caused by biting down on a bone in a hamburger purchased from a Wendy's restaurant. Whether the bone in the hamburger caused the product to be unfit for consumption, i.e., "defective," is the keystone to resolving whether plaintiff's claims for breach of implied warranty should have survived Wendy's' motion for a directed verdict.
Wendy's, relying on this Court's decision in Adams v. Tea Co., 251 N.C. 565, 112 S.E.2d 92 (1960), contends that plaintiff's claim for breach of implied warranty must fail because the bone was "natural" to the foodstuff. In Adams the plaintiff bit down
on a piece of crystallized corn in his spoonful of cornflakes, cracking his eyetooth, and brought an action for breach of implied warranty against the retailer. This Court held that nonsuit (the precursor of a directed verdict) had been properly entered upon plaintiff's evidence, "where the substance causing the injury [was] natural to the corn flakes, and not a foreign substance, and where a consumer of the product might be expected to anticipate the presence of the substance in the food." 251 N.C. at 572, 112 S.E.2d at 95.
The Court of Appeals construed this language as establishing a two-part inquiry: "(1) whether the substance causing the injury is natural or foreign; and (2) if natural, whether 'a consumer of the product might be expected to anticipate the presence of this substance in the food.'" 100 N.C. App. at 114, 394 S.E.2d at 835 (quoting Adams v. Tea Co., 251 N.C. at 572, 112 S.E.2d at 98). See also Evart v. Suli, 211 Cal. App. 3d 605, 611 n.4, 259 Cal. Rptr. 535, 539 n.4 (1989) (reading Mix v. Ingersoll Candy Co., 6 Cal. 2d 674, 59 P.2d 144 (1936), as stating similar two-part test and Adams as adopting second prong).
The question is whether by this language the Adams Court meant to adopt a two-prong test for liability under which a plaintiff could prevail on either prong, or whether it was the Court's intent to adopt the rule that whenever a substance causing injury is natural to the food itself there can be no liability because every consumer should anticipate and be on guard against the presence of such a substance. For the reasons that follow, we conclude the Adams Court took the latter approach.
The Court in Adams surveyed a number of cases from other jurisdictions in which substances "natural" to the food had caused injury. The Court regarded as anomalous the rejection of the "foreign-natural" distinction in Bonenberger v. Pittsburgh Mercantile Co., 345 Pa. 559, 28 A.2d 913 (1942), in which the court declined to say "as a matter of law" that a can of oysters containing a quarter-sized piece of shell "was reasonably fit for human consumption." Id. at 563, 28 A.2d at 915. The Court in Adams appeared to join what was then a majority of jurisdictions which espoused the view that a substance "natural" to the injurious food cannot be a "defect" in the food so as to cause the seller of the food to be liable.
No case has been found . . . holding that because an article has retained a portion of itself that was intended to be extracted . . . the product has thereby been rendered unwholesome
and unfit for human consumption. Only when the courts have found extraneous, foreign matter to be present have they held defendant liable for breach of warranty, in either tort or trespass.
251 N.C. at 571, 112 S.E.2d at 97 (quoting Recent Cases: Sales -- Foods -- Implied Warranties, 17 Temple U.L.Q. 203, 204 (1942-43)).
In Mix v. Ingersoll Candy Co., 6 Cal. 2d 674, 59 P.2d 144 (1936), quoted copiously and relied upon in Adams, the California Supreme Court observed the statutory requisite that food be "reasonably" fit for its purpose and opined,
in certain instances a deviation from perfection, particularly if it is of such a nature as in common knowledge could be reasonably anticipated and guarded against by the consumer, may not be such a defect as to result in the food being not reasonably fit for human consumption.
Id. at 681, 59 P.2d at 147-48, quoted in Adams v. Tea Co., 251 N.C. at 567-68, 112 S.E.2d at 96 (emphasis added).
In Adams the Court noted that, at the time, no court except the Pennsylvania Court in Bonenberger had extended liability based on implied warranty to a restaurateur when the substance causing injury was natural to the food served. According to the Adams Court's research, in all other existing cases in which the food was found not to be reasonably fit for human consumption, it was by reason of contamination by a foreign substance or the food's own noxious condition. In contrast, "bones which are natural to the type of meat served cannot legitimately be called a foreign substance, and a consumer who eats meat dishes ought to be on his guard and anticipate against such bones." Adams v. Tea Co., 251 N.C. at 568, 112 S.E.2d at 95 (quoting Mix v. Ingersoll Candy Co., 6 Cal. 2d at 682, 59 P.2d at 148).
The Court in Adams restated numerous holdings in which courts exercising the "foreign-natural" test articulated in Mix held "natural" defects in foods do not violate the restaurateur's implied warranty. In ...