Appeal by respondent from order entered 6 December 1996 by Judge Carolyn D. Johnson in Durham County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 30 March 1998.
The opinion of the court was delivered by: McGEE, Judge.
Casey Malone was born 22 November 1991 to Judy and Raymond Malone. On 17 March 1995, Judy and Raymond were divorced in Florida where the family had been living. Judy Malone had custody of Casey as set forth in the Malones' separation agreement which was incorporated into their Florida divorce judgment. On or about 1 April 1996, Judy Malone relocated to Durham, North Carolina and established a residence there with Casey.
On 1 May 1996, a report was made to the Durham County Department of Social Services (DSS) alleging that Casey had been sexually abused by her father while in Florida. Pamelia Pinchback, an investigator with Child Protective Services, was assigned to the case. After contacting the Florida Department of Human Rehabilitative Services (HRS) for assistance in Casey's case, Pinchback filed a juvenile petition on 14 May 1996 alleging Casey had been sexually abused. The petition requested that the trial court conduct a hearing and issue a non-secure custody order granting immediate temporary custody of the child to (DSS). The court granted custody of Casey to DSS on 14 May 1996 and placed her in the care of her mother, Judy Malone. The trial court issued additional orders for continued custody on 16 May, 31 May, 5 June, 11 June, and 24 June 1996. DSS continued to have custody of Casey pending the adjudication and Disposition of the petition.
In an order entered 6 December 1996, the trial court made findings of fact that respondent filed a motion to dismiss on 19 July 1996 asserting that there existed an outstanding action in Collier County, Florida concerning the custody and visitation of Casey Malone. The motion requested that in the alternative, the trial court transfer the matter to the Florida court. In a hearing held 31 July 1996 and in an order entered 13 September 1996, the trial court found that Raymond Malone had made a general appearance. The trial court also concluded it had jurisdiction to hear the matter under the North Carolina Juvenile Code, that under N.C. Gen. Stat.§ 50A-3(a)(3) the court had emergency jurisdiction, and that the court retained subject matter jurisdiction.
On 1 October 1996, respondent filed a renewed motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. On 10 October 1996, a second hearing was held in which the court reasserted the jurisdiction of the North Carolina court and found that
[t]here is no provision in the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act [PKPA] which precludes a child protection agency from filing a juvenile petition to protect a child from neglect or abuse. There being no provision precluding a child protection agency from filing a petition alleging neglect and abuse, there is no conflict between the federal legislation and the North Carolina Juvenile Code.
A hearing on the merits of the juvenile petition was held on 23 October and 24 October 1996. In an order entered 6 December 1996, the trial court found, based upon the evidence, that Casey had shown to her mother, other family members, and a day care operator, behaviors which included nightmares, twisting her hands and shaking her head in a ticking fashion, taking her clothes off and masturbating, trying to French kiss her dolls, and grabbing her mother's breasts.
The trial court found that Dr. Mary Baker Sinclair, an expert in clinical psychology, conducted a mental health evaluation of Casey. Through a series of meetings with Casey, Dr. Sinclair diagnosed that she suffered from post traumatic stress disorder. Dr. Sinclair testified that Casey identified her father, Raymond Malone, as the person who touched her private parts. The trial court also found that Dr. Laura Gutman conducted a medical examination of Casey which revealed an abnormal anal exam showing wide anal gaping as a result of penetrative anal trauma. Dr. Gutman confirmed anal sexual abuse of the child.
The trial court made findings of fact and Conclusions of law that Casey Malone was a sexually abused child and that Raymond Malone sexually abused her. The trial court ordered that all visitation and contact between Raymond Malone and Casey be suspended pending recommendation by the child's treating therapist that contact be resumed. It is from this order that Raymond Malone appeals. Respondent has not appealed from the trial court's earlier non-secure custody orders.
Respondent Raymond Malone argues that the trial court erred by: (1) exercising subject matter jurisdiction over the custody and visitation of Casey Malone by adjudicating the petition in this case; (2) failing to contact the Florida court exercising jurisdiction over custody of the child to determine the appropriate forum to litigate the merits of the petition; and (3) in exercising personal jurisdiction over respondent.
Respondent first argues that the trial court erred in exercising subject matter jurisdiction over the custody and visitation of Casey Malone. At the time of the filing of the petition in Durham, North Carolina respondent alleges an action had previously been filed in Collier County, Florida concerning the custody and visitation of Casey Malone. In orders resulting from hearings held on 31 July 1996 and 10 October 1996, the North Carolina trial court stated it exercised jurisdiction over the custody and visitation of Casey through the emergency provisions of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA), as set forth in Chapter 50A of the North Carolina General Statutes, and the North Carolina Juvenile Code, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A- 516-744 (Cum. Supp. 1997). In the 10 October 1996 order, the trial court also found that the PKPA did not preclude DSS from filing a juvenile petition to protect the child from abuse.
The UCCJA was designed to reduce interstate jurisdictional disputes in custody determinations and to prevent forum shopping by parents and other litigants dissatisfied with the results of custody cases. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50A-1 (1989). "The UCCJA expressly includes within its jurisdictional parameters proceedings in abuse, dependency, and/or neglect." In re Van Kooten, 126 N.C. App. 764, 768, 487 S.E.2d 160, 162-63 (1997), appeal dismissed, ___ N.C.___, ___ S.E.2d ___ (1998). Thus, the courts of this state must meet the requirements of the UCCJA in order to have jurisdiction to adjudicate abuse petitions. Van Kooten, 126 N.C. at 768, 487 S.E.2d at 163. This is true even in light of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-523(a) (1995) which states that the district courts of North Carolina have "exclusive, original jurisdiction over any case involving a juvenile who is alleged to be . . . abused, neglected, or dependent." We recognize, as petitioner argues, that In the Matter of Arends, 88 N.C. App. 550, 556, 364 S.E.2d 169, 172 (1988) appears to suggest that the UCCJA does not apply in relation to Chapter 7A of the N.C. General Statutes, being the North Carolina Juvenile Code. Arends, however, addresses a different factual and procedural situation. In accordance with our Court in Van Kooten, we also do not read Arends "as holding that the UCCJA does not apply in the context of the Juvenile Code." Van Kooten, 126 N.C. App. at 768, 487 S.E.2d at 163 (footnote 1).
The PKPA, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738A (1994) was designed to remedy inconsistent interpretation of the UCCJA by different state courts and to create a uniform standard. Meade v. Meade, 812 ...