THIS MATTER is before the Court on Plaintiff's Motion to Consolidate and Brief in Support (Documents #10,11), both filed on September 13, 2010. On October 7, 2010, Defendants filed a Response to Plaintiff's Motion to Consolidate (Document #19) to which Plaintiff filed a Reply (Document #20) on October 15, 2010.
Plaintiff Tammy Hughes-Brown was employed by the defendants*fn2
(collectively, Campus Crest) from June 2, 2008 to the
present. Hughes-Brown was hired as an executive assistant to
Defendants Michael Hartnett and Ted Rollins at Campus Crest's
Charlotte headquarters, during which time she and other female
employees were allegedly subjected to a sexually and racially hostile
work environment due to the offensive conduct of Campus Crest's Chief
Operating Officer Brian Sharpe. Hughes-Brown alleges that although she
never received any formal reprimands regarding her work, she was
transferred to an administrative assistant position on March 2, 2009,
under the direction of Jason Young and Marc McNeill, who continued to
create a hostile working environment. Hughes-Brown contends that in
her place, Campus Crest hired a less-experienced, white male who was
paid a higher salary for the exact same duties that she had performed.
On October 5, 2009, Hughes-Brown was reduced to a part-time position after allegedly confronting Young about offensive comments he had made. She contends that this was in retaliation for having complained about the sexually-hostile working environment to which she had been subjected. Hughes-Brown contends that she complained about the conduct of Hartnett, Rollins, Young, MacNeil, and particularly Sharpe on many occasions to Campus Crest's human resources manager, Janice Miller, but while Miller acknowledged and sympathized with Plaintiff's concerns, Miller said that nothing could be done as she hadpreviously communicated these concerns to Rollins and Hartnett, who did nothing.
On October 6, 2009, Hughes-Brown filed a charge of discrimination against Campus Crest with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), alleging violations of Title VII. Two days later, Hughes-Brownstates that she again complained to Miller and also to Campus Crest's in-house legal counsel abut her work environment and retaliatory demotion to part-time employment. The next week, Hughes-Brown was moved from the area just outside Young's office to the general office area allegedly referred to by Sharpe as "the hood." On October 21, 2009, Hughes-Brown amended her charge of discrimination to include claims that she had been subjected to a sexually and racially hostile working environment and that she had been the subject of retaliation, all in violation of TitleVII.
In January 2010, Hughes-Brown returned to full-time status, working at the receptionist desk, where she claims to be subject to restrictions that no other administrative employee endures. The EEOC issued its notice of right to sue on May 12, 2010 and Hughes-Brown filed her Complaint in this Court on August 9, 2010.*fn3 The plaintiff now seeks to consolidate the instant action with one currently pending before this Court-- Civil Action No. 3:10cv00102, styled Heather McCormack & Nicole M. McAuliffe v. Campus Crest Group, LLC, et al. In that case, the plaintiffs allege that Brian Sharpe subjected them and other female employees to a sexually hostile and demeaning work environment in violation of Title VII.
Consolidation of cases is governed by Rule 42(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides as follows:
If actions before the court involve a common question of law or fact, the court may: 1) join for hearing or trial any or all matters at issue in the actions; (2) consolidate the actions; or (3) issue any other orders to avoid unnecessary cost or delay. Fed.R.Civ.P. 42(a).
According to the Fourth Circuit, "district courts have broad discretion under [Rule] 42(a) to consolidate causes pending in the same district." A/S Ludwig Mowinckles Rederi v. Tidewater Constr., 559 F.2d 928, 933 (4th Cir. 1977). When exercising this discretion, district courts should "weigh the risk of prejudice and confusion versus the possibility of inconsistent adjudication of common factual and legal issues, the burden on the parties, witnesses, and judicial resources by multiple lawsuits, the length of time required to try multiple suits versus a single suit, and the relative expense required for multiple suits versus a single suit." In re Cree, Inc., 219 F.R.D. 369, 371 (M.D.N.C. 2003) (citing Arnold v. Eastern Air Lines, 681 F.2d 186, 193 (4th Cir. 1982)).
Applying Rule 42(a), the Court finds that while these cases involve some common questions of law and fact, they are separate and distinct cases. Consolidation is therefore inappropriate.
In determining whether consolidation is appropriate, the Fourth Circuit case of Harris v. L & L Wings, Inc., 132 F.3d 978 (4th Cir. 1997) provides this Court with guidance. In Harris, two plaintiffs, both hourly employees that worked in the same warehouse, brought suit against their employer. Id. at 980-81. The discriminatory incidents alleged in both suits were essentially the same, occurred essentially at the same time, and were perpetrated by many of the same individuals. Id. Additionally, both cases relied on many of the same witnesses and the ...