United States District Court, W.D. North Carolina, Charlotte Division
MAX O. COGBURN, Jr., District Judge.
THIS MATTER is before the court on review of a Memorandum and Recommendation issued in this matter. In the Memorandum and Recommendation, the magistrate judge recommended denial of defendants' Motion to Dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and advised the parties of the right to file objections within 14 days, all in accordance with 28, United States Code, Section 636(b)(1)(c). Objections have been filed within the time allowed, oral arguments have been heard on those objections, and the court has considered the underlying Motion to Dismiss de novo.
FINDINGS and CONCLUSIONS
I. Applicable Standard
The Federal Magistrates Act of 1979, as amended, provides that "a district court shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specific proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made." 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Camby v. Davis , 718 F.2d 198, 200 (4th Cir.1983). However, "when objections to strictly legal issues are raised and no factual issues are challenged, de novo review of the record may be dispensed with." Orpiano v. Johnson , 687 F.2d 44, 47 (4th Cir.1982). Similarly, de novo review is not required by the statute "when a party makes general or conclusory objections that do not direct the court to a specific error in the magistrate judge's proposed findings and recommendations." Id . Moreover, the statute does not on its face require any review at all of issues that are not the subject of an objection. Thomas v. Arn , 474 U.S. 140, 149 (1985); Camby v. Davis , 718 F.2d at 200. Nonetheless, a district judge is responsible for the final determination and outcome of the case, and accordingly the court has conducted a careful review of the magistrate judge's recommendation.
II. Factual Setting
For the limited purpose of considering the Motion to Dismiss, the court has considered as true the well-pled facts contained in the Complaint. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). In the interests of judicial economy, the court has summarized the facts as alleged in this case and in the 446 case together. Such recitation is not intended to bind this court or the parties in any way in this case or in the 446 case.
According to the Complaint, defendants originated, securitized, and sold billions of dollars in home loans by late 2007. By that same date, however, senior employees and management of the defendants knew that despite such uptick in its mortgage loan origination business, a significant percentage of the mortgages originated by the bank failed to materially comply with the bank's underwriting standards. Not only did they know that there were problems in loan origination, there were problems in servicing those loans as a significant percentage of those loans were performing poorly.
According to the SEC, the problem with the loans was one created by the bank: rather than reward its employees for originating quality loans (to wit, loans that were taken out by qualified borrowers who brought equity and collateral to the table), the bank was rewarding quantity by giving bonuses to employees who surpassed mortgage production targets. Apparently, these employees were able to surpass goals by bringing in unqualified borrowers who took out loans they either could not pay back because they lacked sufficient income or had no incentive to pay back because they had no skin in the game, or both. Thus, by the end of 2007, the bank knew the loans it was repackaging for sale to others in the form of "Residential Mortgage Backed Securities" ("RMBS") were not the investment grade products investors were looking to add to their portfolios. The SEC contends that the bank's pre-2008 zealousness in originating loans and earning fees was so fervent that it resulted in the bank directing its employees that it was not their job to look for fraud when originating home mortgage loans.
The SEC contends that not only were underwriting practices critical in originating loans, those practices were a critical factor for investors tasked with deciding whether to purchase RMBS. As securities, representations and disclosures made to prospective buyers of RMBS are regulated by the United States Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC"). While an oversimplification, the SEC requires that those who undertake to sell securities to the public provide potential investors with truthful financial statements and other significant information. More specifically, the Securities Act of 1933 prohibits deceit, misrepresentations, and other fraud in the sale of securities and requires those offering securities to register the securities and provide offering information to the SEC.
With those obligations in mind, the SEC contends that senior bank employees knew that these poor quality loans were not performing well, but were being bundled into RMBS that they were representing to be high quality securities. It further contends that these same employees produced "Offering Documents and Preliminary Marketing Materials" for what would become Defendants' last RMBS offering - the BOAMS 2008-A securitization. In those materials, the SEC contends that defendants made representations about the quality of the mortgages collateralizing the BOAMS 2008-A securitization, how the bank originated those mortgages, and the likelihood that the borrowers behind those mortgages would make their scheduled payments in a timely fashion. The SEC contends that all of these representations were knowingly false. Further, the SEC contends that these employees failed to undertake the required due diligence in researching the performance of the loans underlying the securities.
While the submission of fraudulent offering statements to the public could certainly form the basis of private claims against defendants by those who relied on those statements to their detriment (which is not at issue in this action), the Offering Documents were filed with the SEC and, the SEC contends, were relied on by two "covered institutions": the Federal Home Loan Bank of San Francisco ("FHLB-San Francisco"); and two entities affiliated with Wachovia Bank. The BOAMS 2008-A Certificates were backed by $855 million in home loans and the purchasers were lead to believe they were purchasing high quality, prime securities. In the end, BOAMS 2008-A suffered significant losses.
The SEC contends that the securitization at issue was simply defendants' way of transferring the risks of these toxic loans to investors in order to avoid any losses associated with the loans comprising BOAMS 2008-A. The SEC alleges that defendants misled potential investors by failing to disclose that seventy-two percent of the mortgages originated in the wholesale channel, as well as the risks associated with those types of loans, and that investors were directed to information in prior RMBS offerings as indicative of the characteristics of BOAMS 2008-A. Wachovia and FHLB-SF bought approximately ninety-eight percent of the securities offered. On August 6, 2013, the SEC filed this Complaint. The SEC seeks an injunction, civil ...