United States District Court, W.D. North Carolina, Asheville Division
FRANK D. WHITNEY, Chief District Judge.
THIS MATTER is before the Court on Plaintiff Larry Cook's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (Doc. No. 8), filed on May 29, 2014, and Defendant Acting Commissioner of Social Security Carolyn W. Colvin's ("Commissioner's") Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 10), filed on July 28, 2014. Plaintiff seeks judicial review of an unfavorable administrative decision on his application for disability benefits.
Having reviewed and considered the written arguments, administrative record, and applicable authority, and for the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings is DENIED, Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED, and the Commissioner's decision is AFFIRMED.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff filed a Title II application for disability insurance benefits February 9, 2011, alleging a disability onset date of April 1, 2006. (Tr. 142-44). The claim was initially denied on July 4, 2011, (Tr. 90), and again upon reconsideration on August 15, 2011. (Tr. 102). Subsequently, on September 8, 2011, Plaintiff filed a written request for an administrative hearing (Tr. 109), and Administrative Law Judge Michael J. Davenport ("ALJ") held a hearing on August 10, 2012. (Tr. 14). On August 28, 2012, the ALJ issued a decision finding that Plaintiff was not disabled. (Tr. 11). Plaintiff timely requested review by the Appeals Council. (Tr. 1). By notice dated November 20, 2013, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request for further administrative review. (Tr. 1). Thus, the ALJ's decision of August 28, 2012, became the final decision of the Commissioner.
Plaintiff timely filed this action on January 16, 2014, (Doc. No. 1), and the parties' Motions for Summary Judgment and Judgment on the Pleadings are now ripe for review pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner in social security cases is authorized pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), and is limited to consideration of (1) whether substantial evidence supports the Commissioner's decision and (2) whether the Commissioner applied the correct legal standard. Hays v. Sullivan, 907 F.2d 1453, 1456 (4th Cir. 1990) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 390 (1971); Coffman v. Bowen, 829 F.2d 514, 517 (4th Cir. 1987)). District courts do not review a final decision of the Commissioner de novo. Smith v. Schweiker, 795 F.2d 343, 345 (4th Cir. 1972). A reviewing court must uphold the decision of the Commissioner, even in instances where the reviewing court would have come to a different conclusion, so long as the Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence. Lester v. Schweiker, 683 F.2d 838, 841 (4th Cir. 1982). Substantial evidence is "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Mastro v. Apfel, 270 F.3d 171, 176 (4th Cir. 2001) (quoting Richardson, 402 U.S. at 401). "It consists of more than a mere scintilla of evidence but may be somewhat less than a preponderance." Id. (quoting Laws v. Celebrezze, 368 F.2d 640, 642 (4th Cir. 1966), overruled by implication on other grounds by Black & Decker Disability Plan v. Nord, 538 U.S. 822 (2003)); see also Parker v. Kraft Foods Global, Inc., No. 3:07-cv-87, 2010 WL 1929555, at *5 (W.D. N.C. May 12, 2010). In reviewing for substantial evidence, a court should not undertake to re-weigh conflicting evidence, make credibility determinations, or substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner. Barnes ex rel. T.J. v. Colvin, No. 4:12-cv-254, 2014 WL 126039, at *1 (E.D. N.C. Jan. 13, 2014) (citing Craig v. Chater, 76 F.3d 585, 589 (4th Cir. 1996), superseded by regulation on other grounds, 20 C.F.R. § 416.927). The ALJ, and not the Court, has the ultimate responsibility for weighing the evidence and resolving an conflicts. Hays, 907 F.2d at 1456.
The question before the ALJ was whether Plaintiff was "disabled" under the Social Security Act between November 5, 2010, and the date of the ALJ's decision. Plaintiff has the burden of proving he was disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act in order to be entitled to benefits. Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 146 n.5 (1987).
On August 28, 2012, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was not "disabled" at any time between November 5, 2010, and the date of his decision. (Tr. 14-21). Under the Social Security Act, there is a five-step sequential process for determining whether a person is disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(1). Those five steps are: (1) whether the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2) whether the claimant has a severe medically determinable impairment or a combination of impairments that is severe; (3) whether the claimant's impairment or combination of impairments meets or medically equals one of The Listings in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1; (4) whether the claimant has the residual functional capacity ("RFC") to perform the requirements of his past relevant work; and (5) whether the claimant is able to do any other work, considering his RFC, age, education, and work experience. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i-v).
In this case, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff was not disabled under the fifth step of the evaluation process. (Tr. 20). The ALJ concluded that "considering the claimant's age, education, work experience, and residual functional capacity, there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that the claimant can perform." (Tr. 20).
On appeal, Plaintiff presents one sole assignment of error: that the ALJ failed to specifically discuss Plaintiff's allegation that he needed to raise his legs several times per day. (Doc. No. 9). Plaintiff contends the allegation is "entirely ignored in [the ALJ's] decision" and, therefore, the ALJ's finding that Plaintiff was not "disabled" is not supported by substantial evidence. (Doc. No. 9). However, a review of the record establishes that the ALJ did consider Plaintiff's statements concerning the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of his alleged symptoms.
The determination of whether a person is disabled by non-exertional pain or other symptoms is a two-step process. "First, there must be objective medical evidence showing the existence of a medical impairment which results from anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities and which could reasonably be expected to product the pain or other symptoms alleged." Craig v. Chater, 76 F.3d 585, 594 (4th Cir. 1996) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 416.929(b)). Here, the ALJ found that Plaintiff's medically determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to produce the ...