United States District Court, Western District of North Carolina, Charlotte Division
ROBERT W. SAYMAN, MARY B. SAYMAN, Plaintiffs,
ASHLEY RICHEY, ANDREW J. PETERSON, GODDARD & PETERSON, PLLC, NATIONSTAR MORTGAGE, LLC Defendants.
Frank D. Whitney, Chief United States District Judge
THIS MATTER is before the Court on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 8) and Motion for Pre-filing Injunction (Doc. No. 20-1). Defendant, through counsel, seeks a pre-filing injunction to prohibit Plaintiffs from filing any further pleadings in the current case. Regarding Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, (Doc. No. 8), in accordance with Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1975), the Court advised Plaintiffs, who are proceeding/)ro se, of the heavy burden that they carry in responding to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss.
Having reviewed and consider the written arguments, administrative record, and applicable authority, for the reasons set forth below. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED, Plaintiffs Pro Se Complaint is DISMISSED in its entirety, and Defendant's Motion for Pre-filing Injunction is DENIED.
On August 4, 2014, Plaintiffs Robert and Mary Sayman filed a/to se complaint against Defendants Ashley Richey, Andrews Peterson, Goddard & Peterson, and Nationstar Mortgage (“Nationstar”). (Doc. No. 1). This complaint is the second action filed by Plaintiffs in this Court against Nationstar arising out of a 2007 real estate transaction. The Court dismissed the first action for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted (3:13-cv-288, Doc. No. 41), and the Fourth Circuit dismissed on appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Sayman v. Lehman Bros., 14-1575, 2015 WL 105598 (4th Cir. 2015).
At the 2007 real estate closing, Plaintiffs executed Promissory Notes and Deeds of Trust. (Doc. No. 1). In the first action, Plaintiffs accused Defendants of improperly “monetizing” those documents. (3:13-cv-288, Doc. No. 34). In the present action, Plaintiffs allege:
The present quasi-judicial hearing as being exercised itself is against North Carolina Rules and Federal Rules of Evidence §§901, 902, 1002, 1003 and§803.6 [sic] and the North Carolina and the Federal Uniform Commercial Code Title §25 N.C. G.S. §§25-3-101 to 25-3-605 and §25-9-203 is unconstitutional for it uses copies of Promissory and Deed of Trust Notes unverified and inadmissible accounting figures without the production of supporting accounting ledgers and defective affidavits with [sic] violated both State and Federal Law §803.6 and 56(e).
(Doc. No. 1, p. 10, ¶ 19). Plaintiffs also appear to allege violations under the Federal Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”), North Carolina General Statues, the Uniform Commercial Code, and the North Carolina Commerical Code. However, it is unclear from the complaint how or why Plaintiffs contend any of these laws were violated. It is also unclear what actually transpired during this real estate transaction. Plaintiffs allege:
On or about July 18, 2007 [sic] Plaintiffs unwittingly executed a Deed of Trust and Promissory Note; the exact terms of which, and, the extent to which it adversely affected Plaintiffs [sic] rights, without recourse, were purposely left unknown. . . . Plaintiff had no knowledge whatsoever as to particular cognovits terms contained within the Deed of Trust, which, Plaintiff learned much later, contained, inter alia, a small and somewhat hidden and/or disguised provision, known as a Power of Sale Clause that, [sic] Plaintiff now finds defendant wanton to, individually and severally invoke, in order to literally confiscate Plaintiff’s property without due process.
(Doc. No. 1, p. 8, ¶ 11-12). Further, after interests in the Notes were transferred several times, Defendant Nationstar now claims to be owner of Plaintiffs’ Promissory Notes and Deeds of Trust. (Doc. No. 1). Defendants have not produced the original promissory notes and deeds of trust, but have provided Plaintiffs copies of these documents. Id.
Plaintiffs also seek to enjoin Defendants from selling, converting, or dispossessing them of the real estate property named in the aforementioned note. Id. Plaintiffs include Defendants Goddard & Peterson, PLLC (“Goddard”), Richey, and Peterson in this action by alleging:
Defendants [Goddard] and Peterson acting under the respondeat superior relationship with Defendant [Nationstar] has [sic] failed to investigate whether [Nationstar] is in legal possession of the promissory and mortgage note(s) and has the right to enforce the notes(s) in a foreclosure action and has violated Title 15 U.S.C. §2692e(2)(a) . . . and Article 3 as codified in Title 25 N.C. G.S. §§13-3101 to 13-4605 and N.C. G.S. 25-9-302.
Defendant [Nationstar, Goddard], Richey and Peterson has [sic] intentionally violated the supreme law of the land . . . by filing a foreclosure complaint on May28, 2014 [sic] without proving the existence of any original note(s) in direct contradiction to a ruling of Chief Justice John Marshal in Sheehy v. Mandeville, 11 U.S. 208, 218 (1812). . . .
(Doc. No. 1, p.12, ¶ 22-23). Finally, Plaintiffs allege that this case involves civil rights issues under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and violations of the First, Fifth, Seventh, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution because Defendants deprived Plaintiffs of their right to own property and their access to courts. (Doc. No. 1).
DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM
Defendant Nationstar moves to dismiss pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) and 8(a)(2) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim tests the sufficiency of the complaint, and a complaint which does not state a “short and plain statement of the claim” is not sufficient under this standard. Republican Party of N.C. v. Martin, 980 F.2d 943, 952 (4th Cir. 1992).
Under Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 8, a party seeking relief must set forth a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Further, the allegations contained within the pleading must be “simple, concise, and direct.” Id. at 8(d)(2). While the court must treat the facts alleged in the complaint in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, the court does not need to accept as true “unwarranted inferences, unreasonable conclusions, or arguments.” Eastern Shore Mkts. v. J.D. Assoc., 213 F.3d 175, 180 (4th Cir. 2000). A pleading must contain enough information to ...