United States District Court, Eastern District of North Carolina, Western Division
AMY L. WEBB, Plaintiff,
CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant.
KIMBERLY A. SWANK, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
This matter is before the court pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c) on the parties' cross motions for judgment on the pleadings [DE # 25 & 27], the parties having consented to proceed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). Plaintiff Amy L. Webb filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) seeking judicial review of the denial of her application for disability insurance benefits. The parties have fully briefed the issues, and the pending motions are ripe for adjudication. On February 19, 2015, the court held oral argument in the matter. The court has carefully reviewed the administrative record and the motions and memoranda submitted by the parties and considered the arguments of counsel. For the reasons set forth below, the court grants Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, denies Defendant's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and remands this matter to the Commissioner for further proceedings.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiff applied for disability insurance benefits on August 7, 2010, alleging disability beginning June 17, 2010. (Tr. 19.) The application was denied initially and upon reconsideration, and a request for hearing was filed. (Id.) On July 19, 2012, a hearing was held before Administrative Law Judge Edward Bowling ("ALJ"), who issued an unfavorable ruling on August 17, 2012. (Tr. 12.) Plaintiffs request for review by the Appeals Council was denied December 27, 2013, making the ALJ's decision the final decision of the Commissioner. (Tr. 1.) Plaintiff now seeks judicial review of the final administrative decision.
I. Standard of Review
The scope of judicial review of a final agency decision denying disability benefits is limited to determining whether substantial evidence supports the Commissioner's factual findings and whether the decision was reached through the application of the correct legal standards. See Coffman v. Bowen, 829 F.2d 514, 517 (4th Cir. 1987). Substantial evidence is "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion; [i]t consists of more than a mere scintilla of evidence but may be somewhat less than a preponderance." Craig v. Chater, 76 F.3d 585, 589 (4th Cir. 1996) (quoting Laws v. Celebrezze, 368 F.2d 640, 642 (4th Cir. 1966)) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) (alteration in original). '"In reviewing for substantial evidence, [the court should not] undertake to re-weigh conflicting evidence, make credibility determinations, or substitute [its] judgment for that of the [Commissioner].'" Mastro v. Apfel, 270 F.3d 171, 176 (4th Cir. 2001) (quoting Craig, 76 F.3d at 589) (internal quotation marks omitted) (first and second alterations in original). Rather, in conducting the "substantial evidence" inquiry, the court determines whether the Commissioner has considered all relevant evidence and sufficiently explained the weight accorded to the evidence. Sterling Smokeless Coal Co. v. Akers, 131 F.3d 438, 439-40 (4th Cir. 1997). "Judicial review of an administrative decision is impossible without an adequate explanation of that decision by the administrator." DeLoatche v. Heckler, 715 F.2d 148, 150 (4th Cir. 1983).
II. Disability Determination Process
In making a disability determination, the Commissioner utilizes a five-step evaluation process. The Commissioner asks, sequentially, whether the claimant: (1) is engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2) has a severe impairment; (3) has an impairment that meets or equals the requirements of an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, App. 1; (4) can perform the requirements of past work; and, if not, (5) based on the claimant's age, work experience and residual functional capacity can adjust to other work that exists in significant numbers in the national economy. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520; Albright v. Comm'r of the Soc. Sec. Admin., 174 F.3d 473, 74 n.2 (4th Cir. 1999). The burden of proof and production during the first four steps of the inquiry rests on the claimant. Pass v. Chater, 65 F.3d 1200, 1203 (4th Cir. 1995). At the fifth step, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to show that other work exists in the national economy that the claimant can perform. Id.
III. ALJ's Findings
Applying the five-step, sequential evaluation process, the ALJ found Plaintiff "not disabled" as defined in the Act. (Tr. 20.) At step one, the ALJ found Plaintiff had not been engaged in substantial gainful employment since the alleged onset date. (Tr. 21.) Next, he determined that Plaintiff had the following severe impairments: obesity, rheumatoid arthritis, psoriasis, intermittent bradycardia and mild osteoarthritis. (Tr. 215.) However, at step three, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiffs impairments were not severe enough, either individually or in combination, to meet or medically equal one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. (Tr. 22.)
Prior to proceeding to step four, the ALJ assessed Plaintiffs residual functional capacity ("RFC"), and found that Plaintiff had the ability to perform a reduced range of light work. Specifically, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff could "frequently] but not constantly] use [her] bilateral upper extremities for fine and gross manipulations" but should "never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds" and should "avoid concentrated exposure to hazards." (Tr. 23.) The ALJ further determined that Plaintiff was able to perform past relevant work as a help desk representative as generally performed. (Tr. 28.) Alternatively, he made step-five findings, determining that based upon Plaintiffs age, education, work experience and RFC, there are other jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff can perform - cashier II, housekeeper, and sales attendant. (Tr. 29.)
IV. Plaintiffs Contention
Plaintiffs sole assignment of error is that the ALJ improperly evaluated the medical opinion of Plaintiffs treating rheumatologist, Dr. Maria Watson. (Pl.'s Mem. Supp. Mot. J. Pleadings [DE #26] at 6-8.) Plaintiff contends that Dr. Watson's opinion is consistent with her treatment notes ...