United States District Court, W.D. North Carolina, Charlotte Division
C. Mullen, United States District Judge
MATTER is before the Court on an initial review of
Petitioner's pro se motion for reduction in his sentence
which the Court finds is in fact an unauthorized, successive
§ 2255 motion to vacate pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
2255(h). For the reasons that follow, the Court finds that
Petitioner's motion for relief will be DISMISSED.
November 29, 2005, Petitioner was sentenced to a term of
200-months' imprisonment following his conviction for
conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine, in
violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and 841 (Count 1);
and a consecutive term of 60-months' imprisonment
following his conviction for using and carrying a firearm in
furtherance of a drug trafficking crime and aiding and
abetting the same, all in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§
924(c)(1) and 2 (Count 4). (3:04-cr-00161, Doc. No. 55:
Judgment). Petitioner's judgment was affirmed on appeal.
See United States v. Reyes, 207 F. App'x 327
(4th Cir. 2006) (unpublished). On September 29, 2016, this
Court dismissed Petitioner's pro se § 2255 motion to
vacate his sentence and he did not appeal. Reyes v.
United States, No. 3:16-cv-00663-GCM (W.D. N.C. Sept.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
to Rule 4(b) of the Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings,
sentencing courts are directed to promptly examine motions to
vacate, along with “any attached exhibits and the
record of prior proceedings” in order to determine
whether a petitioner is entitled to any relief.
contends that he is entitled to relief based on the case of
Beckles v. United States, No. 15-8544 (2016), in
which the Supreme Court is considering the following
questions:(1) Whether its holding in Johnson v.
United States, 135 S.Ct. 2551 (2015), applies
retroactively to cases on collateral review that challenge
federal sentences enhanced under the residual clause in
Section 4B1.2(a)(2) of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines
Manual (USSG); (2) Whether the constitutional holding in
Johnson applies to the residual clause in USSG
§ 4B1.2(a)(2), thereby rendering challenges to a
sentence enhanced under it cognizable on collateral review?;
and (3) Whether the mere possession of a sawed-off shotgun,
which is an offense listed as a “crime of
violence” exclusively in the commentary to USSG. §
4B1.2, remains a “crime of violence” after
Petitioner does not label his motion for relief from his
sentence as a § 2255 motion to vacate, it is plain from
the substance of his motion that the redress he is seeking is
properly considered under the provisions of § 2255.
United States v. Winestock, 340 F.3d 200, 203 (4th
Cir. 2003) (It is well-settled that district courts are bound
to “classify pro se pleadings from prisoners
according to their contents, without regard to their
captions.”) (internal citation omitted). Accordingly,
the Court must treat his motion as a successive motion
brought pursuant to § 2255. See Gonzalez v.
Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 531 (2005); Winestock,
340 F.3d at 206-07.
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act provides, in
relevant part, that “[a] second or successive motion
[under Section 2255] must be certified as provided in Section
2244 by a panel of the appropriate court of appeals to
(1) newly discovered evidence that, if proven and viewed in
light of the evidence as a whole, would be sufficient to
establish by clear and convincing evidence that no reasonable
factfinder would have found the movant guilty of the offense;
(2) a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to
cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was
28 U.S.C. § 2255(h).
§ 2244 plainly demonstrates, the Circuit Court must
grant authorization to file a successive § 2255 motion
and Petitioner has offered no evidence that he has obtained
the necessary authorization. Consequently, this Court is
without jurisdiction to consider Petitioner's present
claim for relief, and ...