BARRY D. EDWARDS, XMC FILMS, INCORPORATED, AEGIS FILMS, INC., and DAVID E. ANTHONY, Plaintiffs,
CLYDE M. FOLEY, RONALD M. FOLEY, LAVONDA S. FOLEY, SAMUEL L. SCOTT, CRS TRADING CO. LLC., BROWN BURTON, RONALD JED MEADOWS, and AMERICAN SOLAR KONTROL, LLC, Defendants.
in the Court of Appeals 4 May 2017.
by Defendants from order entered 28 June 2016 by Judge James
G. Bell in Robeson County Superior Court Robeson County, No.
12 CVS 3117.
and Smith, P.A., by Alexander C. Dale, Edward J. Coyne, III,
and Knight Johnson, LLC, by Bryan M. Knight, for the
Brooks, Pierce, McLendon, Humphrey & Leonard, L.L.P., by
Kimberly M. Marston and Walter L. Tippett, Jr., for the
appeal from an order granting Plaintiffs' motion for
summary judgment. For the following reasons, we dismiss
Defendants' appeal as interlocutory.
Foley is a co-founder of XMC Films ("XMC"), a
Virginia corporation that produces coated film products. This
matter involves a dispute between Mr. Foley and other
minority shareholders and XMC and its current management.
filed numerous claims against Defendants. In response,
Defendants filed a motion to dismiss, answer, counterclaims,
and a third-party complaint.
and Defendants filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The
trial court granted Plaintiffs' motion for summary
judgment on Defendants' counterclaims but denied
Defendants' motion for summary judgment on
appealed the trial court's order granting Plaintiff's
summary judgment motion on Defendants' counterclaims
and denying Defendants' motion for summary
judgment; however, in their appellate brief, Defendants
failed to articulate any substantial right affected by the
trial court's interlocutory order. After Plaintiffs filed
their appellee brief pointing out this deficiency, Defendants
requested that this Court allow them to amend their brief.
For the reasons below, we denied Defendants' motion to
amend their principal brief and hereby dismiss their appeal
from the trial court's interlocutory order.
interlocutory order is one made during the pendency of an
action, which does not dispose of the case, but leaves it for
further action by the trial court in order to settle and
determine the entire controversy." Veazey v. City of
Durham, 231 N.C. 357, 362, 57 S.E.2d 377, 381 (1950). As
a general rule, there is no right of appeal from an
interlocutory order. See Jeffreys v. Raleigh Oaks Joint
Venture, 115 N.C.App. 377, 379, 444 S.E.2d 252, 253
(1994). However, a party is permitted to appeal an
interlocutory order if " . . . the trial court
certifies in the judgment that there is no just reason to
delay the appeal[, ]" or if " the order deprives
the appellant of a substantial right which would be
jeopardized absent a review prior to a final determination on
the merits." Id. at 379, 444 S.E.2d at 253
(internal marks and citations omitted). "Under either of
these two circumstances, it is the appellant's burden to
present appropriate grounds for this Court's acceptance
of an interlocutory appeal[.]" Id.
present case, because the trial court declined to certify the
matter for immediate appeal, it was Defendants' burden to
establish on ...