United States District Court, E.D. North Carolina, Western Division
C. DEVER III Chief United States District Judge
Laschkewitsch ("Laschkewitsch" or
"plaintiff') is a familiar litigant. See,
e.g.. Laschkewitsch v. Legal & Gen. Am..
Inc.. No. 5:15-CV-251-D. 2017 WL1102619. at *1 (E.D.
N.C. Mar. 23, 2017) (unpublished). In this case, on September
21, 2016, this court denied as baseless Laschkewitsch's
motion to modify or correct Transamerica Life Insurance
Company's ("Transamerica" or
"defendant") arbitration award of $540, 723.76
[D.E. 42] and his motion to vacate the arbitration award and
to dismiss Transamerica's petition for confirmation [D.E.
43]. See Order [D.E. 44]. On October 19, 2016,
Laschkewitsch moved for reconsideration of that order under
Rules 52(b) and 59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
[D.E. 47]. On November 3, 2016, Transamerica responded in
opposition [D.E. 49]. On November 23, 2016, Laschkewitsch
replied [D.E. 51]. As explained below, the court denies
Laschkewitsch's motion for reconsideration.
bases his motion on both Rules 52(b) and 59(e). Rule 52,
however, applies only in "action[s] tried on the facts
without a jury or with an advisory jury." Fed.R.Civ.P.
52(a)(1); see O'Hara v. Comptroller of Md.. No.
TDC-14-4044, 2016 WL 2760337, at *1 (D. Md. May 12, 2016)
(unpublished), affd, 670 F.App'x 777 (4th Cir. 2016) (per
curiam) (unpublished). That did not happen here. Thus, the
court denies relief under Rule 52(b).
Rule 59(e), "[i]n general, reconsideration of a judgment
after its entry is an extraordinary remedy which should be
used sparingly." Pac. Ins. Co. v. Am. Nat'l Fire
Ins. Co.. 148 F.3d 3 96, 403 (4th Cir. 1998) (quotation
omitted). A Rule 59(e) motion may thus be granted in only
three situations: "(1) to accommodate an intervening
change in controlling law; (2) to account for new evidence
not available at trial; or (3) to correct a clear error of
law or prevent manifest injustice." Mavfield v.
Nat'l Ass'n for Stock Car Auto Racing. Inc.. 674
F.3d 369, 378 (4th Cir. 2012) (quotation omitted); see
Zinkand v. Brown. 478 F.3d 634, 637 (4th Cir. 2007).
Rule 59(e) motions may not be used "to raise arguments
which could have been raised prior to the issuance of the
judgment, nor may they be used to argue a case under a novel
legal theory that the party had the ability to address in the
first instance." Pac. Tns. Co.. 148 F.3d at
argues that this court must grant his motion to reconsider in
order "to correct clear errors and prevent manifest
injustice and manifest errors in the law and in fact
regarding the arbitrator's award and this court's
confirmation." [D.E. 51] 2. This argument fails if the
court's decision under reconsideration "was
factually supported and legally justified."
Hutchinson v. Staton. 994 F.2d 1076, 1081-82 (4th
Cir. 1993). Mere disagreement with the court's decision
is not a proper basis for a Rule 59(e) motion. Id.
at 1082. Nor can a party invoke Rule 59(e) to
"relitigate old matters." Exxon Shipping Co. v.
Baker. 554 U.S. 471, 485 n.5 (2008) (quotation omitted):
see Pac. Tns. Co.. 148 F.3d at 403.
"Consequently, a Rule 59(e) motion is not intended to
allow for reargument of the very issues that the court has
previously decided and is not intended to give an unhappy
litigant one additional chance to sway the judge."
Melvin v. Social Security Admin.. No. 5:14-CV-170-F,
2016 WL 7383542, at *1 (E.D. N.C. Sept. 26, 2016)
(unpublished) (alterations, citations, and quotations
omitted), affd. No. 16-2248, 2017 WL 1506644 (4th
Cir. Apr. 27, 2017) (per curiam) (unpublished); see
Palmer v. Champion Mortg.. 465 F.3d 24, 30 (1st Cir.
2006); Zimmerman y. Citv of Oakland. 255 F.3d 734,
740 (9th Cir. 2001); Fox v. Am. Airlines. Inc.. 295
F.Supp.2d 56, 60 (D.D.C. 2003), affd, 389 F.3d 1291 (D.C.
Rule 59(e) motion Laschkewitsch simply disagrees with this
court's order dismissing his motion to modify or correct
the arbitration award and his motion to vacate that award. In
doing so Laschkewitsch reasserts the same meritless legal
arguments that this court previously rejected.
Compare [D.E. 42, 43], with [D.E. 48]. The
arguments have not improved with age and do not warrant
reconsideration. Accordingly, the court denies his motion.
Laschkewitsch's motion fails because this court's
decision "was factually supported and legally
justified." Hutchinson. 994 F.2d at 1081-82.
Laschkewitsch's motions challenged the arbitrator's
decision in favor of Transamerica. "[T]he scope of
judicial review for an arbitrator's decision is among the
narrowest known at law because to allow full scrutiny of such
awards would frustrate the purpose of having arbitration at
all-the quick resolution of disputes and the avoidance of the
expense and delay associated with litigation." MCI
Constructors. LLC v. City of Greensboro. 610 F.3d 849,
857 (4th Cir. 2010) (quotation omitted). "[I]n reviewing
such an award, a district or appellate court is limited to
determine whether the arbitrators did the job they were told
to do-not whether they did it well, or correctly, or
reasonably, but simply whether they did it." Three S
Del.. Inc. v. DataOuick Info. Svs.. Inc.. 492 F.3d 520,
527 (4th Cir. 2007) (quotation omitted). "An arbitration
award is enforceable even if the award resulted from a
misinterpretation of law, faulty legal reasoning or erroneous
legal conclusion, and may only be reversed when arbitrators
understand and correctly state the law, but proceed to
disregard the same." Upshur Coals Corp. v. United
Mine Workers of Am.. Dist. 31. 933 F.2d 225, 229 (4th
Cir. 1991) (citations and quotations omitted).
seeking vacatur Laschkewitsch bore "the heavy burden of
showing one of the grounds specified in the Federal
Arbitration Act (the 'FAA') or one of certain limited
common law grounds." MCI Constructors. LLC. 610
F.3d at 857: see Patten v. Signator Ins. Agency.
Inc.. 441 F.3d 230.234 (4th Cir. 2006). Under the FAA, a
court may vacate an arbitration award only on one of the
(1) where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or
(2) where there was evident partiality or corruption in the
arbitrators, or either of them;
(3) where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in
refusing to postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause
shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material
to the controversy; or of any other misbehavior by which the
rights of any party have been prejudiced; or
(4) where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so
imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final, and definite
award upon the subject matter submitted was not made.
U.S.C. § 10(a); see MCI Constructors. LLC. 610
F.3d at 857. As for the common law, "[t]he permissible
common law grounds for vacating such an award include those
circumstances where an award fails to draw its essence from
the contract, or the award evidences a manifest disregard of
the law." MCI Constructors. LLC. 610 F.3d at
857 (quotations omitted); see Patten. 441 F.3d at
argues that no enforceable arbitration agreement existed.
This court has twice concluded otherwise and did not clearly
err in doing so. See [D.E. 20, 31]. As for
Laschkewitsch's arguments concerning the recognized
grounds for vacating an arbitrator's award, the court has
applied the relevant legal standards and concludes that
Laschkewitsch failed to carry his burden of proving that the
award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means,
that the arbitrator demonstrated evident impartiality or
corruption,  that the arbitrator engaged in misconduct
or improperly refused to hear evidence,  that the
arbitrator exceeded the scope of his powers or imperfectly
executed them such that a mutual, final, and definite award
upon the subject matter submitted was not made,
that the award fails to draw its essence from the contract,
that the award evidences a manifest disregard for the
Thus, Laschkewitsch fails to show that reconsideration of
this court's order denying his ...