Searching over 5,500,000 cases.


searching
Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

Andrews v. Berryhill

United States District Court, W.D. North Carolina, Charlotte Division

August 11, 2017

EVERETT LEE ANDREWS, Plaintiff,
v.
NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant.

          Martin Reidinger United States District Judge.

         THIS MATTER is before the Court on the Plaintiff's Motion for Attorney Fees under 42 U.S.C. Section 406(b) [Doc. 18].

         I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

         On June 23, 2015, the Plaintiff initiated this action seeking judicial review of the Commissioner's decision to deny his application for benefits under the Social Security Act. [Doc. 1]. On August 31, 2016, this Court reversed the Commissioner's decision denying the Plaintiff's application for benefits and remanded the case to the Appeals Council for further administrative action. [Doc. 13]. On November 4, 2016, the Court awarded the Plaintiff attorney's fees in the amount of $5, 000.00 in full satisfaction of any and all claims by the Plaintiff pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d) (EAJA). [Doc. 17].

         On August 6, 2017, the Commissioner issued a Notice of Award to the Plaintiff. [Doc. 18-3]. The Notice of Award explains that $16, 779.25, representing 25% of the Plaintiff's back benefits, was being withheld from the Plaintiff's back benefits to pay any award of attorney's fees. [Id. at 3]. The Plaintiff and his attorney had a contingency fee agreement pursuant to which any attorney's fee award could not exceed 25 percent of the past due benefits. [Doc. 18-2].

         The Plaintiff now seeks a total award of $16, 779.25 in fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1). [Doc. 19].

         II. DISCUSSION

         There are two avenues by which a Social Security benefits claimant may be awarded attorney's fees. First, claimants may seek a fee award under the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d) (EAJA), which provides that “a court shall award to a prevailing party other than the United States fees and other expenses ... incurred by that party in any civil action (other than cases sounding in tort), including proceedings for judicial review of agency action, brought by or against the United States in any court having jurisdiction of that action....” 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A). Second, a claimant may seek an award pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406(b), which provides that “[w]henever a court renders a judgment favorable to a claimant ... who was represented before the court by an attorney, the court may determine and allow as part of its judgment a reasonable fee for such representation, not in excess of 25 percent of the total of the past-due benefits to which the claimant is entitled by reason of such judgment....” 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)(A).

         While attorney's fees may be awarded under both the EAJA and § 406(b), the Social Security Act requires that the attorney must refund to the claimant the smaller fee. “Thus, an EAJA award offsets an award under Section 406(b), so that the amount of the total past-due benefits the claimant actually receives will be increased by the EAJA award up to the point the claimant receives 100 percent of the past-due benefits.” Stephens ex rel. R.E. v. Astrue, 565 F.3d 131, 134-35 (4th Cir. 2009) (quoting Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 796 (2002)).

         Here, the Plaintiff and his counsel entered into a contingency fee agreement by which the Plaintiff agreed to pay 25% of any past due benefits awarded to his counsel. As the Fourth Circuit has recognized, “§ 406(b) was designed to control, not to displace, fee agreements between Social Security benefits claimants and their counsel. As long as the agreement does not call for a fee above the statutory ceiling of twenty-five percent of awarded past-due benefits, ... § 406(b) simply instructs a court to review the agreement for reasonableness.” Mudd v. Barnhart, 418 F.3d 424, 428 (4th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation and citation omitted).

         The Court finds that the services rendered in this Court were appropriate and reasonable to the relief sought, and the contingency fee agreement executed by the Plaintiff and his counsel is reasonable. Accordingly, the Plaintiff's Motion for Attorney's Fees is granted.

         ORDER

         IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the Plaintiff's Motion for Attorney Fees under 42 U.S.C. Section 406(b) [Doc. 18] is hereby GRANTED, and an award of attorney's fees in the amount of Sixteen Thousand Seven Hundred Seventy-Nine Dollars and Twenty-Five Cents ($16, 779.25) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)(A) is hereby approved.

         IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that upon receipt of the ยง 406(b) fees, Plaintiff's counsel is hereby instructed to return to the Plaintiff the sum of $5, 000.00, representing the fee that counsel previously received ...


Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.