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Prentice v. Federal Bureau of Prisons

United States District Court, E.D. North Carolina, Western Division

August 28, 2017

STEVEN DIXON PRENTICE, Petitioner,
v.
FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS, Respondent.

          ORDER

          LOUISE W. FLANAGAN UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.

         The matter now is before the court on respondent's motion to dismiss pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (DE 23). Also before the court are petitioner's motion for order to rescind detainer (DE 12) and request for order of records by subpoena (DE 30). The issues raised have been fully briefed and are ripe for adjudication.

         BACKGROUND

         Petitioner was convicted in the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina of receiving child pornography videotapes and using a minor to engage in sexually explicit conduct for the purpose of producing videotapes. On August 27, 2001, the court sentenced petitioner to 180 months and 210 months imprisonment to run concurrently, together with restitution of $8, 100.00. See Order, United States v. Prentice, No. 1:01-CR-31-JAB-1 (M.D. N.C. Jan. 27, 2016); see also Docket Entry, Prentice, No. 1:01-CR-31-JAB-1 (M.D. N.C. Aug. 27, 2001). In a separate state court criminal action, petitioner was convicted of a first-degree sex offense, first- degree rape, and indecent liberties in conjunction with his rape of a three-year old child as depicted in the videos. See Order, Prentice, No. 1:01-CR-31-JAB-1 (M.D. N.C. Jan. 27, 2016).

         On April 7, 2014, petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, “alleging various claims regarding property seized following his arrest, issues surrounding the payment of his restitution order, funds paid by him in the form of inmate medical co-pays, the loss of his prison job, the denial of access to the Bureau of Prisons (‘BOP') TRULINCS1 inmate email system, issues concerning language in his Presentence Investigation Report (‘PSR'), and challenging several of his supervised release conditions.” Prentice v. Bureau of Prisons, No. 5:14-HC-2062-BO, 2015 WL 4928953 (E.D. N.C. Aug. 18, 2015) (hereinafter “Prentice I”), aff'd sub nom. Prentice v. Andrews, 633 Fed.Appx. 587 (4th Cir. 2016). These claims included challenges to the payment schedule imposed by the BOP through the Inmate Financial Responsibility Program (“IFRP”). Id. at * 4. Petitioner's first § 2241 petition was dismissed on the merits upon motion for summary judgment.

         On January 9, 2015, petitioner filed a civil rights complaint pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). See Prentice v. Bureau of Prisons, et al., No. 5:15-CT-3006-H (E.D. N.C. Jan. 9, 2015). In that complaint, petitioner challenged the BOP's application of the IFRP. Specifically, petitioner claimed that the defendants improperly managed his prison account by misapplying funds, garnishing funds in excess of court-ordered restitution, losing other funds, and retaining or collecting additional funds without justification. See Order, Prentice, No. 5:15-CT-3006-H (E.D. N.C. Mar. 17, 2016). The court allowed the action to continue on a due process claim contained in the complaint, but dismissed petitioner's claim challenging the BOP's administration of the IFRP on the ground that “[t]he IFRP is a means of executing a prisoner's sentence; therefore, complaints about the BOP's administration of the program are cognizable under 28 U.S.C. § 2241.” See id., No. 5:15-CT-3006-H (E.D. N.C. Mar. 17, 2006). Petitioner's surviving claims were subsequently dismissed due to his failure to exhaust. See Order, Prentice, No. 5:15-CT-3006-H (E.D. N.C. February 14, 2017).

         On April 15, 2016[1], petitioner filed the instant habeas petition pursuant to § 2241, again challenging the BOP's payment collection through the IFRP (DE 1). On April 19, 2016, petitioner was released from federal custody. See https://www.bop.gov/inmateloc/ (last visited August 28, 2017). He is presently in state confinement at Lanesboro Correctional Institution. see https://webapps.doc.state.nc.us/opi/viewoffender.do?method=view&offenderID=1502120&searc hLastName=prentice&searchFirstName'steven&listurl=pagelistoffendersearchresults&listpage=1 (last visited August 28, 2017).

         On November 11, 2016, petitioner filed a motion in which he seeks “an Order to the Federal Bureau of Prisons . . . to rescind a bogus detainer.” (Mot. (DE 12) at 1). Specifically, he contends that BOP records incorrectly indicate that he has an outstanding warrant for failure to appear in Honolulu, Hawaii. Id. at 4. Although not entirely clear, petitioner appears to allege that the existence of the detainer is negatively affecting his state custody classification, and could also negatively affect his release from state custody. Id. at 8.

         On January 30, 2017, respondent filed the instant motion to dismiss (DE 23) and responded to petitioner's motion to rescind detainer (DE 25). Petitioner responded to the motion to dismiss.

         DISCUSSION

         A. Standard of Review

         Under Rule 12(b)(1), the petitioner bears the burden of showing that federal jurisdiction is appropriate when challenged by respondents. McNutt v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178, 189 (1936); Adams v. Bain, 697 F.2d 1213, 1219 (4th Cir. 1982). When the Rule 12(b)(1) motion attacks the complaint as failing to state facts upon which subject matter jurisdiction may be based, the facts in the complaint are assumed to be true and the petitioner is afforded the same protections he or she would receive under a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. Adams, 697 F.2d at 1219. The Rule 12(b)(1) motion may attack alternatively the existence of subject matter jurisdiction in fact, apart from the complaint. Id. This type of attack is used when a court's limited jurisdiction precludes hearing the case brought. Materson v. Stokes, 166 F.R.D. 368, 371 (E.D. Va. 1996) (citing Mortensen v. First Fed. Sav. And Loan Ass'n, 549 F.2d 884, 891 (3rd Cir. 1977)); Adams, 697 F.2d at 1219. Because the court's power to hear the case is at issue in a Rule 12(b)(1) motion, the court is free to weigh the evidence to determine the existence of jurisdiction. Adams, 697 F.2d at 1219.

         A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) determines only whether a claim is stated; “it does not resolve contests surrounding the facts, the merits of a claim, or the applicability of defenses.” Republican Party v. Martin, 980 F.2d 943, 952 (4th Cir. 1992). A claim is stated if the complaint contains “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). In evaluating whether a claim is stated, “[the] court accepts all well-pled facts as true and construes these facts in the light most favorable to the [petitioner], ” but does not consider “legal conclusions, elements of a cause of action, . . . bare assertions devoid of further factual enhancement[, ] . . . unwarranted inferences, unreasonable conclusions, or arguments.” Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 591 F.3d 250, 255 (4th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted). In other words, this plausibility standard requires a ...


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