United States District Court, W.D. North Carolina, Charlotte Division
D. Whitney, Chief United States District Judge
MATTER is before the Court on initial review of
Plaintiff Obadiah Doctor's pro se civil Complaint, filed
on March 16, 2017 (Doc. No. 1), and Plaintiff's
Application to Proceed in District Court without Prepaying
Fees or Costs (“IFP Application”) (Doc. No. 2).
Court has examined Plaintiff's IFP Application and prison
trust fund account statement (Doc. No. 5). It appears he does
not have sufficient funds to proceed in this matter.
Therefore, the Application shall be granted.
was a prisoner of the State of North Carolina when he filed
this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. At all times
relevant to this Complaint, he was housed at Lanesboro
Correctional Institution (“LCI”) on control
status. (Compl. ¶ 10, Doc. No. 1.) Plaintiff names as
defendants David Mitchell, identified as Superintendent of
LCI, Prison Health Services Manager, identified as the
manager of health services at LCI, J. Bennett, identified as
the superintendent of programs at LCI, Kevin Ingram,
identified as a unit manager at LCI, and FNU McClamrock,
identified as a former nurse at LCI.
asserts that he suffers from a “neurasthenic condition,
constant irregular bowel movements/burning stomach problems,
. . . chronic neuromuscular pains, . . . chronic [migraines,
]” and type-2 diabetes. (Compl. ¶¶ 11, 34.)
He alleges that between July 6, 2015, and October 9, 2015, he
was not seen by medical personnel within a reasonable time of
putting in sick call requests, there were constant delays in
refilling his prescription pain medications, and although he
was seen by a nurse, he was never seen by a doctor or a
physician's assistant (“P.A.”). Plaintiff
asserts that he was in constant pain and harmed himself
several times because of it and because he was unable to see
a doctor, P.A., or someone in mental health.
on July 13, 2015, Plaintiff asked to see mental health, but
his request was denied. Thereafter, he told Defendant
Mitchell that he “really needed to see mental health,
” and Mitchell replied that he would pass
Plaintiff's request “to mental health, personally.
(Compl. ¶ 18.) Plaintiff was not seen by mental health
informed Defendant Ingram on July 14, 2015, that he had asked
to see mental health the previous day but was not seen, and
that he still needed to talk to someone in mental health.
When Ingram asked why, Plaintiff responded, “It's
personal, but I'm feeling suicidal.” Plaintiff
alleges Ingram said, “Whatever[, ] man, ya'll
fellows kill me with this mental health bullshit, ” and
walked off. Plaintiff was not seen by mental health that day
and “ended up committing [a] self injury.”
(Compl. ¶¶ 19-24.)
September 22, 2015, according to the Complaint, Plaintiff
told FNU McClamrock during morning medical call that he had a
medical emergency and asked her to check his blood sugar.
Plaintiff states he explained to McClamrock that he had
type-2 diabetes, had not eaten his last four meals, and that
he was sick. McClamrock refused to pull him out of his cell
to check his blood sugar and told him to put in a sick call.
(Compl. ¶¶ 32-35.)
Plaintiff refused to eat his next meal due to having a severe
migraine, stomach pain, nausea and dull chest pain. He called
a medical emergency, and about an hour later, another nurse
pulled Plaintiff out of his cell and checked his blood sugar.
His blood sugar was very low and his blood pressure was high.
The nurse gave Plaintiff a sugar tab and crackers, and sent
him back to his cell. Later, “due to being in so much
pain and feeling as if medical didn't want to help him,
” Plaintiff took an overdose of medication. (Compl.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court must
review the Complaint to determine whether it is subject to
dismissal on the grounds that it is “frivolous, ”
“malicious, ” “fails to state a claim on
which relief may be granted, ” or “seeks monetary
relief against a defendant who is immune from such
relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). In its frivolity
review, the Court must determine whether the Complaint raises
an “indisputably meritless legal theory, ”
Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32 (1992), or is
founded upon clearly baseless factual contentions, such as
“fantastic or delusional scenarios, ” Neitzke
v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327-28 (1989).
complaint fails to state a claim if after accepting all
well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true and drawing
all reasonable factual inferences from those allegations in
the plaintiff's favor, the complaint does not contain
“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). While a pro se
complaint must be construed liberally, see Haines v.
Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), the liberal
construction requirement will not permit a district court to
ignore a plaintiff's clear failure to allege facts which
set forth a claim that is cognizable under federal law,
see Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387
(4th Cir. 1990).