United States District Court, W.D. North Carolina, Asheville Division
D. WHITNEY, CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
MATTER is before the Court on initial review of
Plaintiff's Complaint, (Doc. No. 1). He is proceeding
in forma pauperis. (Doc. No. 7).
se Plaintiff Robbie Sherron is a North Carolina prisoner
who is complaining about events that occurred at the Mountain
View Correctional Institution in Spruce Pine, North
Carolina. He names as Defendants the following
Mountain View C.I. employees: Administrator Mike Slagle,
Assistant Superintendent of Program Services Dexter Gibbs,
Medical Doctor Assistant Keith Damico, and “State
Actors et. al unknown at this time.” (Doc. No. 1 at 3).
the allegations liberally and accepting them as true, Medical
Assistant Domico interfered with Plaintiff's ability to
receive adequate medical treatment for his prior back injury
and “Hep-c-liver damage” (Doc. No. 1 at 4).
Domico refused to provide medical treatment for these serious
needs, ignored Plaintiff's prior prison medical history,
and refused to provide treatment for his previously diagnosed
conditions. (Doc. No. 1 at 3). Plaintiff is being ignored by
“correctional administrators” and Assistant
Superintendent Gibbs. (Doc. No. 1 at 1). Plaintiff is
suffering from “serious deprivation and physical
pain” and Defendants are breaching their duty of care
by failing to provide timely treatment. (Doc. No. 1 at 4). He
has been denied and delayed eyeglasses, special shoes, back
brace, “disabled devices.” (Doc. No. 1 at 4). His
medical condition is worse now than it would have been had he
received adequate care. Further, he is being charged medical
co-pays for occasions when he was not provided adequate
seeks injunctive relief, damages for his pain, elimination of
the co-pays charged to him when no treatment was provided,
investigation of Mountain View C.I., and all other relief the
Court deems fit and proper. (Doc. No. 1 at 4).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
“court shall dismiss [a prisoner's] case at any
time if the court determines that ... the action or appeal
... fails to state a claim on which relief may be
granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). A
complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a
claim “unless ‘after accepting all well-pleaded
allegations in the plaintiff's complaint as true and
drawing all reasonable factual inferences from those facts in
the plaintiff's favor, it appears certain that the
plaintiff cannot prove any set of facts in support of his
claim entitling him to relief.'” Veney v.
Wyche, 293 F.3d 726, 730 (4th Cir. 2002) (quoting
Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 244 (4th
Cir. 1999)). In its frivolity review, a court must determine
whether the Complaint raises an indisputably meritless legal
theory or is founded upon clearly baseless factual
contentions, such as fantastic or delusional scenarios.
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327-28 (1989).
pro se complaint must be construed liberally.
Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972); see
also Smith v. Smith, 589 F.3d 736, 738 (4th Cir. 2009)
(“Liberal construction of the pleadings is particularly
appropriate where … there is a pro se complaint
raising civil rights issues.”). However, the liberal
construction requirement will not permit a district court to
ignore a clear failure to allege facts in his complaint which
set forth a claim that is cognizable under federal law.
Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387
(4th Cir. 1990). A pro se complaint must still
contain sufficient facts “to raise a right to relief
above the speculative level” and “state a claim
to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 570 (2007); see
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (the
Twombly plausibility standard applies to all federal
civil complaints including those filed under § 1983).
This “plausibility standard requires a plaintiff to
demonstrate more than a sheer possibility that a defendant
has acted unlawfully.” Francis v. Giacomelli,
588 F.3d 186, 193 (4th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks
omitted). He must articulate facts that, when accepted as
true, demonstrate he has stated a claim entitling him to
John Doe Defendants
Doe suits are permissible only against “real, but
unidentified, defendants.” Schiff v. Kennedy,
691 F.2d 196, 197 (4th Cir. 1982). The designation of a John
Doe defendant “is generally not favored in federal
courts; it is appropriate only when the identity of the
alleged defendant is not known at the time the complaint is
filed and the plaintiff is likely to be able to identify the
defendant after further discovery.” Njoku v.
Unknown Special Unit Staff, 217 F.3d 840, 840 (4th Cir.
2000). “[I]f it does not appear that the true identity
of an unnamed party can be discovered through discovery or
through intervention by the court, the court could dismiss
the action without prejudice.” Schiff, 691
F.2d at 197-98.
names as Defendants “State Actors et. al unknown at
this time.” He has failed to state any factual
allegations whatsoever against these John Doe Defendants, and
thus, the claims against them would be insufficient to
proceed even if Plaintiff had provided their names.
See Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2) (short and plain statement
is required); Simpson v. Welch, 900 F.2d 33, 35 (4th
Cir. 1990) (conclusory allegations, unsupported by specific
allegations of material fact are not sufficient); Dickson
v. Microsoft Corp., 309 F.3d 193, 201-02 (4th Cir. 2002)
(a pleader must allege facts, directly or indirectly, that
support each element of the claim).
the claims against the John Doe Defendants