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Chapel H.O.M. Associates, LLC v. RME Management, LLC

Court of Appeals of North Carolina

December 5, 2017

CHAPEL H.O.M. ASSOCIATES, LLC and CHAPEL HILL MOTEL ENTERPRISES, INC., Plaintiffs,
v.
RME MANAGEMENT, LLC, Defendant.

          Heard in the Court of Appeals 8 March 2017.

         Appeal by plaintiffs from order entered 9 June 2016 by Judge R. Allen Baddour, Jr. in Orange County Superior Court. No. 15 CVS 1109.

          Troutman Sanders LLP, by Ashley H. Story and D. Kyle Deak, for plaintiffs-appellants.

          Hedrick Gardner Kincheloe & Garofalo, LLP, by Patricia P. Shields and James R. Baker, for defendant-appellee.

          BERGER, Judge.

         Chapel H.O.M. Associates, LLC ("H.O.M.") and Chapel Hill Motel Enterprises, Inc. ("Chapel Hill") (collectively "Plaintiffs") appeal from an order filed June 9, 2016 granting the motion to dismiss of RME Management, LLC ("Defendant") made pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiffs argue the complaint states claims for which relief may be granted, and the trial court erred by granting Defendant's motion. We affirm in part and reverse in part.

         Factual & Procedural Background

         H.O.M. entered into a forty-nine year lease on March 17, 1966 for a parcel of land in Chapel Hill, North Carolina. The lease contained a renewal option for an additional forty-nine years that, if written notice was given at least six months before lease termination, would have allowed the renewal lease term to begin on January 1, 2016. Chapel Hill sublet the property from H.O.M. beginning on January 9, 1967 for the operation and management of a hotel, and after exercising renewal options, continues to sublet the property.

         While it is unclear when Defendant acquired the subject property from the original landowner, Defendant was the owner of the property as early as January 2014. In accordance with the terms of the original lease, the parties began negotiating renewal of the lease and sublease as early as December 3, 2013 when Chapel Hill communicated its intent to H.O.M. to extend the sublease, and on September 16, 2014 when H.O.M. notified Defendant that it intended to renew its lease. Both parties gave notice to renew well before the six month requirement of the lease and sublease.

         Negotiations for renewal of the lease broke down because the parties could not agree on the method by which the price terms for the renewal of the lease would be set. To establish this price term for the lease contract, the parties were to each appoint a commercial property appraiser, and these two appraisers would appoint a third appraiser. These three appraisers would then negotiate to reach an equitable and fair value of the property and its corresponding lease value to be paid monthly to RME. However, the parties could not agree on the appraisal methodology, and the third appraiser was never appointed.

         After renewal negotiations broke down, Plaintiffs filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina on September 29, 2014. This complaint was dismissed on jurisdictional grounds. Plaintiffs refiled their complaint in Orange County Superior Court on August 28, 2015 stating causes of action for declaratory judgment, equitable estoppel, and unfair and deceptive trade practices. Defendant filed a motion on October 2, 2015 requesting the case be heard in the North Carolina Business Court, and seeking to dismiss Plaintiffs' complaint for failure to state a claim on which relief could be granted. On October 23, 2015, the Superior Court refused to designate the case as a complex business case, and so the case proceeded in Orange County Superior Court. Following a May 31, 2016 hearing on Defendant's motion to dismiss, the trial court entered an order on June 9, 2016 granting the motion with prejudice. It is from this order dismissing each of its causes of action that Plaintiffs have timely appealed.

         Standard of Review

         When a trial court considers a Motion to Dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the court must determine "whether, as a matter of law, the allegations of the complaint, treated as true, are sufficient to state a claim upon which relief may be granted under some legal theory, whether properly labeled or not." Leary v. N.C. Forest Prods., Inc., 157 N.C.App. 396, 400, 580 S.E.2d 1, 4 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted), aff'd per curiam, 357 N.C. 567, 597 S.E.2d 673 (2003). "[A] complaint should not be dismissed for insufficiency unless it appears to a certainty that plaintiff is entitled to no relief under any state of facts which could be proved in support of the claim." Stanback v. Stanback, 297 N.C. 181, 185, 254 S.E.2d 611, 615 (1979) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted), disapproved of on other grounds by Dickens v. Puryear, 302 N.C. 437, 448, 276 S.E.2d 325, 332 (1981). "[A]ll the Rules require is a short and plain statement of the claim that will give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Sutton v. Duke, 277 N.C. 94, 102, 176 S.E.2d 161, 165 (1970) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

         Analysis

         I. Equitable Estoppel

         In North Carolina, the elements of equitable estoppel are:

(1) conduct on the part of the party sought to be estopped which amounts to a false representation or concealment of material facts; (2) the intention that such conduct will be acted on by the other party; and (3) knowledge, actual or constructive, of the real facts. The party asserting the defense must have (1) a lack of knowledge and the means of knowledge as to the real facts in question; and (2) relied upon the conduct of the party sought to be estopped to his prejudice.

Friedland v. Gales, 131 N.C.App. 802, 807, 509 S.E.2d 793, 796-97 (1998) (quoting Parker v. Thompson-Arthur Paving Co., 100 N.C.App. 367, 370, 396 S.E.2d 626, 628-29 (1990)). Generally, equitable estoppel is not a cause of action, and may not be used as a ...


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