United States District Court, E.D. North Carolina, Western Division
C. DEVER III, CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
18, 2016, Darnell Boyd ("Boyd" or
"petitioner"), a federal inmate proceeding pro se,
filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 2241 [D.E. 1], a supporting memorandum [D.E.
1-1], several exhibits [D.E. 1-2], andamotionto expedite
[D.E. 2]. Boydseeks credit againsthis sentence for a period
of time spent in pretrial detention. See Mem. Supp.Pet. [D.E.
1-1] 2-3. On February 8, 2017, the court reviewed the
petition and additional filings pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
2243, allowed it to proceed, and denied the motion to
expedite as moot [D.E. 9].
March 28, 2017, respondent moved to dismiss Boyd's
complaint [D.E. 14] and filed a memorandum in support [D.E.
15]. On April 20, 2017, Boyd responded in opposition [D.E.
21-22], and filed additional exhibits [D.E. 22-1]. On August
31, 2017, the court informed the parties that it intended to
construe respondent's motion as one seeking summary
judgment, and directed the parties to supplement their
filings with additional briefing and exhibits [D.E. 25].
October 12, 2017, respondent moved for summary judgment [D.E.
30], and filed a memorandum in support [D.E. 31], the
declaration of Dawn L. Giddings ("Giddings"), a
Correctional Programs Specialist at the Designation and
Sentence Computation Center for the Bureau of Prisons
("BOP") [D.E. 33-1], and several exhibits. See
[D.E. 33]. On November 6, 2017, Boyd responded in opposition
[D.E. 36] and filed additional exhibits [D.E. 36-1]. As
explained below, the court grants respondent's motion for
12, 2007, Boyd was arrested in Michigan and charged with
receiving and concealing a stolen vehicle and violating his
parole. See Resp't's App'x, Giddings Decl. ¶
4 [D.E. 33-1], Resp't's App'x [D.E. 33-2] 3
(excerpt from presentence report); c£ Mem. Supp. Pet.
[D.E. 1-1] 2. On July 25, 2007, the state court dismissed the
vehicle charge and placed Boyd in the custody of the Michigan
Department of Corrections on the parole violation warrant.
See Mem. Supp. Pet. [D.E. 1-1] 2; Giddings Decl. ¶ 5;
Resp't's App'x [D.E. 33-2] 3 (excerpt from
July 25, 2007, through February 17, 2009, Boyd remained in
state custody on his parole violation warrant and pending the
disposition of additional state criminal
charges. On February 13, 2009, Boyd was charged in
the Eastern District of Michigan with distributing cocaine.
See Resp't's App'x [D.E. 33-11] 2 (administrative
remedy). On February 17, 2009, the United States Court for
the Eastern District of Michigan issued a writ of habeas
corpus ad prosequendum concerning Boyd. See Mem. Supp. Pet.
[D.E. 1-1] 2; Giddings Decl. ¶ 6; Resp't's
App'x [D.E. 33-4] 4 (writ); Resp't's App'x
[D.E. 33-6] 3 (USMS prisoner tracking records);
Pet'r's Supp. Exs. [D.E. 36-1] 8 (copy of criminal
case docket sheet). On August 12, 2011, Boyd pleaded guilty
to the federal cocaine charge. See Resp't's
App'x [D.E. 33-14] 8 (motion for reduction of sentence).
Pursuant to the writ, Boyd remained in federal custody from
February 17, 2009, until his federal sentencing on March 29,
2012. See Pet'r's Resp. Opp'nMot. Dismiss [D.E.
22-1] 2-4 (detention hearing transcript); Resp't's
App'x [D.E. 33-6] 3 (USMS prisoner tracking records); cf
Resp't's App'x [D.E. 33-14] 5 (defense
counsel's brief in support of motion for reduction of
federal court imposed Boyd's federal criminal sentence
"to run concurrently to... any State Sentence."
Resp't's App'x 23 [D.E. 33-5] 3 (criminal
judgment); Giddings Decl. ¶ 7; Resp't's
App'x [D.E. 33-11] 15 (excerpt from sentencing hearing
transcript). Accordingly, the BOP designated the Michigan
state prison system for service of Boyd's federal
sentence, commencing on the date that the federal court
imposed the sentence, March 29, 2012, and Boyd's federal
sentence began to run on that date. See Pet'r's Supp.
Exs. [D.E. 1-2] 2 (BOP administrative remedy response);
Resp't's App'x [D.E. 33-9] 2 (BOP detainer and
notice designating state prison for service of federal
sentence). The BOP, however, did not award Boyd any credit
for the time Boyd spent in state custody for the parole
violation between his July 12, 2007 state arrest and his
federal sentencing on March 29, 2012. See Giddings Decl.
¶¶ 14-16; Resp't's App'x [D.E. 33-11]
2-11 (Boyd's request for administrative remedy and
responses); Resp't's App'x [D.E. 33-12] 2-3
(Willis / Kayfez Calculation Worksheet). The BOP calculates
Boyd's release date as December 13, 2020. Giddings Decl.
April 11, 2012, Boyd moved to reduce his federal sentence.
See Resp't's App'x [D.E. 33-14] 4-12. On June 26,
2012, the court held a hearing on the motion and concluded
that it lacked the authority to grant the requested relief.
See Id. at 18-26; United States v. Wilson.
503 U.S. 329, 333-35 (1992); United States v.
Westmoreland. 974 F.2d 738, 737 (6th Cir. 1992).
March 25, 2013, the Michigan Department of Corrections
conducted a parole violation hearing, found that Boyd had
violated his parole, and re-paroled Boyd with the
recommendation that Boyd "be released to his federal
detainer so that he can begin serving that sentence."
Pet'r's Supp. Exs. [D.E. 1-2] 5 (parole violation
formal hearing summary and recommendation); Resp't's
App'x [D.E. 33-7] 2 (same); see Giddings Decl. ¶ 9.
On May 4, 2013, the Michigan Department of Corrections
discharged Boyd from state custody to his federal detainer.
See Giddings Decl. ¶ 10; Resp't's App'x
[D.E. 33-8] 2 (MDOC certificate of discharge).
seeks credit against his federal sentence from the date of
his state arrest, July 12, 2007, until March 29, 2012, the
date of his federal sentencing. See Mem. Supp. Pet. [D.E.
1-1] 3; Pet'r's Supp. Exs. [D.E. 1-2] 2; Giddings
Decl. ¶ 14. Respondent contends that Boyd is not
entitled to any additional sentencing credit.
judgment is appropriate when, after reviewing the record
taken as a whole, no genuine issue of material fact exists,
and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby. Inc.. 477 U.S.
242, 247-48 (1986). The party seeking summary judgment bears
the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine
issue of material fact. See Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett. 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986). Once the moving party
has met its burden, the nonmoving party may not rest on the
allegations or denials in its pleading, see
Anderson. 477 U.S. at 248-49, but "must come
forward with specific facts showing that there is a genuine
issue for trial." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v.
Zenith Radio Corp.. 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (emphasis
and quotation omitted). A trial court reviewing a motion for
summary judgment should determine whether a genuine issue of
material fact exists for trial. See Anderson. 477
U.S. at 249. In making this determination, the court must
view the evidence and the inferences drawn therefrom in the
light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Scott v.
Harris. 550 U.S. 372, 378 (2007).
may award credit towards a sentence of incarceration for time