United States District Court, E.D. North Carolina, Western Division
ORDER & MEMORANDUM & RECOMMENDATION
T. Numbers, II United States Magistrate Judge
7, 2016, petitioner Somchai Noonsab, a state inmate
proceeding pro se, filed a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (D.E. 1). This
matter is before the court upon respondent's motion for
summary judgment (D.E. 35). Also before the court are a
number of motions filed by Noonsab (D.E. 33, 43, 45, 52). For
the following reasons, Noonsab's motions are denied, and
the undersigned recommends that the district court grant
respondent's motion for summary judgment.
November 18, 2013, Noonsab pleaded guilty to statutory rape,
indecent liberties with a child, first degree kidnapping, and
second degree sexual offense. Resp't. Ex. 1, D.E. 38-1. A
judge sentenced Noonsab to a consolidated term of 192-291
months imprisonment. Resp't. Ex. 2, D.E. 38-2. He did not
appeal. Likewise, Noonsab did not pursue state
post-conviction proceedings until November 20, 2015.
Resp't. Ex. 3, D.E. 38-3.
filed his petition on July 7, 2016. Pet at 25, D.E. 1. The
court construed several subsequent filings as motions to
amend, which were allowed. December 22, 2016 Order, D.E. 21.
But the court noted that Noonsab's allegations were now
distributed throughout at least seven docket entries.
Id. Accordingly, the court directed Noonsab to
particularize his extremely disjointed claims. Id.
Rather than consolidate his claims into one pleading, as
directed by the court, Noonsab responded to the
particularization order with seven additional filings,
including at least two more motions to amend (D.E. 25, 25,
26, 27, 28, 29, 30). On April 5, 2017, the court allowed
these motions to amend and found that Noonsab's claims
survived initial review (D.E. 31). But the court also noted
that any further motions to amend would be strongly
filed a motion for summary judgment in May 2017, arguing that
Noonsab's petition is untimely. In the interim, Noonsab
continued his prolific filing. To the extent these filings
are labeled as motions, the precise relief requested is
judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine issue of
material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 247 (1986). The party
seeking summary judgment bears the burden of initially coming
forward and establishing an absence of a genuine issue of
material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.
317, 323 (1986). Once the moving party has met its burden,
the nonmoving party then must establish that there is a
genuine issue of material fact requiring trial.
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. Ltd. v. Zenith Radio
Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). There is no issue for
trial unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the
non-moving party for a jury to return a verdict for that
party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250.
argues that petitioner's § 2254 petition is
time-barred. The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) requires that any
application for a writ of habeas corpus filed by a person in
custody pursuant to the judgment of a state court be filed
within one year of the latest of certain dates. 28 U.S.C.
§ 2244(d)(1); see Frasch v. Peguese, 414 F.3d
518, 521 (4th Cir. 2005). The limitation period begins
running from the latest of:
(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the
conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for
seeking such review;
(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application
created by State action in violation of the Constitution or
laws of the United States is removed, if the applicant was
prevented from filing by such State action;
(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was
initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has
been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made
retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or
(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or
claims presented could have been discovered through the