United States District Court, M.D. North Carolina
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED
STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Joi
Elizabeth Peake United States Magistrate Judge.
Plaintiff
Deborah Parker (“Plaintiff”) brought this action
pursuant to Sections 205(g) and 1631(c)(3) of the Social
Security Act (the “Act”), as amended (42 U.S.C.
§§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3)), to obtain judicial
review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social
Security denying her claims for Disability Insurance Benefits
and Supplemental Security Income under, respectively, Titles
II and XVI of the Act. The parties have filed cross-motions
for judgment, and the administrative record has been
certified to the Court for review.
I.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff
protectively filed applications for Disability Insurance
Benefits and Supplemental Security Income Benefits on May 22,
2013, alleging a disability onset date of September 8, 2011.
(Tr. at 12, 185-94.)[2] Her applications were denied initially
(Tr. at 48-79) and upon reconsideration (Tr. at 80-103).
Thereafter, Plaintiff requested an administrative hearing de
novo before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”).
(Tr. at 129-30.) Plaintiff attended the subsequent hearing on
March 15, 2016, along with her attorney and an impartial
vocational expert. (Tr. at 12.) The ALJ ultimately concluded
that Plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of the Act
from her alleged onset date through June 2, 2016, the date of
her decision. (Tr. at 21.) On November 14, 2016, the Appeals
Council denied Plaintiff's request for review of the
decision, thereby making the ALJ's conclusion the
Commissioner's final decision for purposes of judicial
review. (Tr. at 1-5.) Plaintiff later filed another
application for benefits, which was approved retroactive to
June 3, 2016, the date after the ALJ's denial. In the
present case, she seeks judicial review of the decision
denying her claim through June 2, 2016.
II.
LEGAL STANDARD
Federal
law “authorizes judicial review of the Social Security
Commissioner's denial of social security benefits.”
Hines v. Barnhart, 453 F.3d 559, 561 (4th Cir.
2006). However, the scope of review of such a decision is
“extremely limited.” Frady v. Harris,
646 F.2d 143, 144 (4th Cir. 1981). “The courts are not
to try the case de novo.” Oppenheim v. Finch,
495 F.2d 396, 397 (4th Cir. 1974). Instead, “a
reviewing court must uphold the factual findings of the ALJ
if they are supported by substantial evidence and were
reached through application of the correct legal
standard.” Hancock v. Astrue, 667 F.3d 470,
472 (4th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation omitted).
“Substantial
evidence means ‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.'” Hunter v. Sullivan, 993 F.2d
31, 34 (4th Cir. 1993) (quoting Richardson v.
Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 390 (1971)). “It consists
of more than a mere scintilla of evidence but may be somewhat
less than a preponderance.” Mastro v. Apfel,
270 F.3d 171, 176 (4th Cir. 2001) (internal citations and
quotation marks omitted). “If there is evidence to
justify a refusal to direct a verdict were the case before a
jury, then there is substantial evidence.”
Hunter, 993 F.2d at 34 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
“In
reviewing for substantial evidence, the court should not
undertake to re-weigh conflicting evidence, make credibility
determinations, or substitute its judgment for that of the
[ALJ].” Mastro, 270 F.3d at 176 (internal
brackets and quotation marks omitted). “Where
conflicting evidence allows reasonable minds to differ as to
whether a claimant is disabled, the responsibility for that
decision falls on the ALJ.” Hancock, 667 F.3d
at 472. “The issue before [the reviewing court],
therefore, is not whether [the claimant] is disabled, but
whether the ALJ's finding that [the claimant] is not
disabled is supported by substantial evidence and was reached
based upon a correct application of the relevant law.”
Craig v. Chater, 76 F.3d 585, 589 (4th Cir. 1996).
In
undertaking this limited review, the Court notes that
“[a] claimant for disability benefits bears the burden
of proving a disability.” Hall v. Harris, 658
F.2d 260, 264 (4th Cir. 1981). In this context,
“disability” means the “‘inability to
engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any
medically determinable physical or mental impairment which
can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can
be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than
12 months.'” Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. §
423(d)(1)(A)).[3]
“The
Commissioner uses a five-step process to evaluate disability
claims.” Hancock, 667 F.3d at 472 (citing 20
C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4); 416.920(a)(4)).
“Under this process, the Commissioner asks, in
sequence, whether the claimant: (1) worked during the alleged
period of disability; (2) had a severe impairment; (3) had an
impairment that met or equaled the requirements of a listed
impairment; (4) could return to her past relevant work; and
(5) if not, could perform any other work in the national
economy.” Id.
A
finding adverse to the claimant at any of several points in
this five-step sequence forecloses a disability designation
and ends the inquiry. For example, “[t]he first step
determines whether the claimant is engaged in
‘substantial gainful activity.' If the claimant is
working, benefits are denied. The second step determines if
the claimant is ‘severely' disabled. If not,
benefits are denied.” Bennett v. Sullivan, 917
F.2d 157, 159 (4th Cir. 1990).
On the
other hand, if a claimant carries his or her burden at the
first two steps, and if the claimant's impairment meets
or equals a “listed impairment” at step three,
“the claimant is disabled.” Mastro, 270
F.3d at 177. Alternatively, if a claimant clears steps one
and two, but falters at step three, i.e., “[i]f a
claimant's impairment is not sufficiently severe to equal
or exceed a listed impairment, ” then “the ALJ
must assess the claimant's residual functional capacity
(‘RFC').” Id. at 179.[4] Step four then
requires the ALJ to assess whether, based on that RFC, the
claimant can “perform past relevant work”; if so,
the claimant does not qualify as disabled. Id. at
179-80. However, if the claimant establishes an inability to
return to prior work, the analysis proceeds to the fifth
step, which “requires the [Government] to prove that a
significant number of jobs exist which the claimant could
perform, despite the claimant's impairments.”
Hines, 453 F.3d at 563. In making this
determination, the ALJ must decide “whether the
claimant is able to perform other work considering both [the
claimant's RFC] and [the claimant's] vocational
capabilities (age, education, and past work experience) to
adjust to a new job.” Hall, 658 F.2d at
264-65. If, at this step, the Government cannot carry its
“evidentiary burden of proving that [the claimant]
remains able to work other jobs available in the community,
” the claimant qualifies as disabled. Hines,
453 F.3d at 567.
III.
DISCUSSION
In the
present case, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in
“substantial gainful activity” since September 8,
2011, her alleged onset date. Plaintiff therefore met her
burden at step one of the sequential evaluation process. At
step two, the ...