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State v. Harding

Court of Appeals of North Carolina

March 6, 2018

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v.
NICHOLAS NACOLEON HARDING

          Heard in the Court of Appeals 1 November 2017.

         Appeal by defendant from judgments and orders entered 18 August 2016 by Judge Marvin P. Pope, Jr. in Buncombe County Superior Court Nos. 13 CRS 63940, 63942.

          Attorney General Joshua H. Stein, by Special Deputy Attorney General Anne J. Brown, for the State.

          Yoder Law PLLC, by Jason Christopher Yoder, for defendant.

          ELMORE, JUDGE

         Defendant Nicholas Nacoleon Harding appeals from judgments entered after a jury convicted him of first-degree sexual offense, first-degree kidnapping, assault on a female, and assault inflicting physical injury by strangulation. He also appeals the trial court's orders requiring him to enroll in lifetime sex offender registration and lifetime satellite-based monitoring (SBM).

         Defendant contends the trial court erred by (1) instructing the jury on two unindicted first-degree kidnapping elements; (2) sentencing him, on double jeopardy grounds, for both kidnapping based on sexual assault and for first-degree sexual offense; (3) sentencing him for both assaults in violation of a statutory mandate requiring that only one sentence be imposed for the same conduct; (4) denying his motion to dismiss the first-degree sexual offense charge for insufficient evidence; and (5) ordering he enroll in lifetime registration and SBM on grounds that the trial court's findings do not support its orders, and that the trial court failed to determine the reasonableness, under the Fourth Amendment, of imposing SBM pursuant to Grady v. North Carolina, ___ U.S. ___, 135 S.Ct. 1368, 191 L.Ed.2d 459 (2015). Defendant also advances (6) five separate claims of ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) that allegedly occurred during sentencing.

         We hold that defendant's first four alleged errors are meritless and thus that he received a fair trial, free of error, and the sentences imposed based upon the jury convictions were proper. However, based on the first issue of defendant's fifth alleged error, we reverse the trial court's registration and SBM orders and remand for further proceedings, including a new SBM hearing. We dismiss defendant's numerous IAC claims without prejudice to his right to reassert them in a subsequent motion for appropriate relief (MAR) proceeding.

         I. Background

         On 8 September 2014, defendant was indicted for first-degree sexual offense, first-degree kidnapping, assault on a female, and assault inflicting physical injury by strangulation. At trial, the State's evidence showed the following facts.

         During the afternoon of 7 December 2013, Anna, [1] a twenty-two-year-old, ninety-five-pound female, was waiting at a bus stop when a stranger, defendant, struck up a conversation with her. Defendant followed Anna onto the bus, after she changed buses, and after she got off at a bus stop on Brevard Road in Asheville. Anna had never taken this route home before and started walking down Pond Road, in a non-residential and "somewhat . . . deserted" area. Defendant followed about ten feet behind. Eventually, defendant caught up to Anna, and the two began walking together and talking. As they continued walking down this isolated stretch of road, they came to an area surrounded by excavation machinery and overlooking a creek about twenty feet below, and Anna stopped to take off her fleece jacket.

         Unexpectedly, defendant "grabbed [Anna's] hair and then . . . tossed [her] over the [em]bank[ment]." When Anna got up, she tried to run away, but defendant "grabbed [her] and started beating [her] face." Anna screamed for help as she fell to the ground. Defendant pinned her body down, grabbed her throat, and "kept choking . . . and hitting [her] until [she] stopped trying to fight him." Defendant agreed to stop his physical assault if Anna quit screaming and resisting. Anna calmed down briefly and begged defendant not to hurt her. Defendant warned Anna that he was a "mob boss, " but instructed her that as long as she did what he demanded, everything would be okay. Anna started screaming again. Defendant "hit [her] in the head" and covered her mouth. When Anna bit defendant's hand, he "hit [her] again in the head multiple times." Eventually, Anna stopped resisting and defendant let her up. After threatening Anna's and her one-year-old child's life, defendant forced Anna to perform fellatio on him.

         Defendant then instructed Anna to sit on a nearby rock near the creek with him while she calmed down. He eventually let Anna retrieve her cell phone and watched as she texted her partner that she was going to be late coming home. Defendant demanded that Anna meet him the next day at 11:00 a.m. in front of the post office downtown and that, if she did not, he "would send somebody to take care of [her] and [her] child." Defendant then instructed Anna to stay put until he walked away and demanded her not to call the police. Once defendant was out of sight, Anna immediately called 9-1-1. Responding officers found defendant walking down a nearby road and arrested him.

         The State also presented Rule 404(b) evidence through the testimony of two other witnesses, Cindy and Lisa.[2] According to Cindy and Lisa, defendant had also attempted, unsuccessfully, to force himself on them only a few days apart from the incident with Anna. Defendant similarly targeted these women in the afternoon, while they were alone, attempted to befriend them and bring them to an isolated location, and demanded sexual favors. Defendant similarly warned these women that he was a "mob boss" when they refused his demands, and threatened their lives if they continued to deny him.

         Defendant presented no evidence, and the jury convicted him on all counts. The trial court consolidated the first-degree-sexual-offense and assault-on-a-female convictions into one judgment, imposing an active sentence of 276 to 392 months in prison; it consolidated the first-degree-kidnapping and assault-by-strangulation convictions into another judgment, imposing a consecutive sentence of 83 to 112 months. The trial court also ordered, inter alia, that defendant enroll in lifetime sex offender registration and SBM. Defendant appeals from the judgments, and from the registration and SBM orders.

         II. Alleged Errors

         On appeal, defendant contends the trial court erred by (1) instructing the jury on two first-degree kidnapping elements which were not charged in the indictment; (2) sentencing him for both first-degree kidnapping and first-degree sexual offense on the double jeopardy grounds that the kidnapping conviction was based on the underlying sexual offense; (3) sentencing him for both assault on a female and assault by strangulation in violation of statutory mandates requiring only one punishment for the same conduct; (4) denying his motion to dismiss the first-degree sexual offense charge for insufficiency of the evidence; and (5) ordering he enroll in lifetime sex offender registration and SBM on the grounds that the trial court's findings were inadequate to support such orders, and a proper Grady hearing on the reasonableness of SBM was never conducted. Defendant also asserts (6) he was denied effective assistance of counsel several times.

         III. Instructing on Unindicted First-Degree Kidnapping Elements

         Defendant first contends the trial court plainly erred by instructing the jury it could find him guilty of first-degree kidnapping based on all three elevating elements of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-39(b) when the indictment only charged the subsection (b) element of sexual assault. We disagree.

         A. Issue Preservation

         Defendant concedes his counsel failed to object to the instructions at trial and is thus entitled only to plain error review of this alleged error. See N.C. R. App. P. 10(b)(2), (c)(4). The State argues that defendant is precluded from plain error review in part under the invited-error doctrine because he failed to object, actively participated in crafting the challenged instruction, and affirmed it was "fine." We disagree.

         Even where the "trial court gave [a] defendant numerous opportunities to object to the jury instructions outside the presence of the jury, and each time [the] defendant indicated his satisfaction with the trial court's instructions, " our Supreme Court has not found the defendant invited his alleged instructional error but applied plain error review. See State v. Hooks, 353 N.C. 629, 633, 548 S.E.2d 501, 505 (2001) (acknowledging that the defendant at multiple times failed to object and approved the challenged instruction but nonetheless electing to review his alleged instructional error for plain error). Further, the transcript excerpt the State cites to support its participating-in-crafting-the-instructions argument concerned the subsection (a) purpose element of kidnapping, not any subsection (b) elements. Accordingly, we conclude this alleged instructional error is not precluded from plain error review.

         B. Review Standard

For error to constitute plain error, a defendant must demonstrate that a fundamental error occurred at trial. To show that an error was fundamental, a defendant must establish prejudice-that, after examination of the entire record, the error had a probable impact on the jury's finding that the defendant was guilty. Moreover, because plain error is to be applied cautiously and only in the exceptional case, the error will often be one that seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings[.]

State v. Lawrence, 365 N.C. 506, 518, 723 S.E.2d 326, 334 (2012) (citations, internal quotation marks, and brackets omitted).

         C. Discussion

         Kidnapping is the unlawful confinement, restraint, or removal, from one place to another, of any person over 16 years old without their consent, for one of six statutorily enumerated purposes. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-39(a) (2013). Kidnapping is elevated to the first-degree if the defendant (1) did not release the victim in a safe place, (2) seriously injured the victim, or (3) sexually assaulted the victim. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-39(b) (2013). "[T]he language of [ N.C. Gen. Stat. §] 14-39(b) states essential elements of the offense of first-degree kidnapping . . . ." State v. Jerrett, 309 N.C. 239, 261, 307 S.E.2d 339, 351 (1983). Thus, "to properly indict a defendant for first-degree kidnapping, the State must allege the applicable elements of both subsection (a) and subsection (b)." Id. (citation omitted).

         "[I]t is error, generally prejudicial, for the trial judge to permit a jury to convict upon a theory not supported by the bill of indictment." State v. Brown, 312 N.C. 237, 248, 321 S.E.2d 856, 863 (1984) (citations omitted); see also id. at 249, 321 S.E.2d at 863 (awarding new first-degree kidnapping trial under plain error review where trial court instructed on an different subsection (a) purpose theory, for which the State presented no supportive evidence, and a different subsection (b) elevating element, than those charged in the indictment). However, our Supreme Court has "found no plain error where the trial court's instruction included the [subsection (a)] purpose that was listed in the indictment and where compelling evidence had been presented to support an additional element or elements not included in the indictment as to which the court had nevertheless instructed." State v. Tirado, 358 N.C. 551, 575, 599 S.E.2d 515, 532 (2004) (citing State v. Lucas, 353 N.C. 568, 588, 548 S.E.2d 712, 726 (2001)); see also id. at 575-76, 599 S.E.2d at 532-33 (finding no plain error where the trial court instructed on ...


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