Searching over 5,500,000 cases.


searching
Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

Golden v. Wells

United States District Court, E.D. North Carolina, Western Division

March 19, 2018

ROBERT LEE GOLDEN, Petitioner,
v.
BRYAN WELLS, Respondent.

          ORDER

          LOUISE W. FLANAGAN United States District Judge.

         Petitioner, a state inmate, petitions this court for a writ of habeas corpus pro se pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The matter comes before the court on respondent's motion to dismiss (DE 8) pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).[1] The issues raised have been fully briefed and are ripe for adjudication. For the following reasons, the court grants respondent's motion.

         STATEMENT OF CASE

         On January 29, 1996, petitioner, in the New Hanover County Superior Court, petitioner pleaded guilty to second-degree murder, and was sentenced to life in prison. (Pet. (DE 1) at 1). Petitioner did not appeal. (Id. at 2).

         On July 24, 2013, petitioner filed a pro se motion for appropriate relief (“MAR”) in the New Hanover County Superior Court, which was denied on August 21, 2013. (Resp't. Ex. 4 (DE 9-5)). Petitioner subsequently filed a petition for a writ of certiorari in the North Carolina Court of Appeals, which was denied on October 21, 2013. (Resp't. Ex. 7 (DE 9-8)). On December 18, 2013, the North Carolina Supreme Court dismissed petitioner's petition for discretionary review. (Resp't. Ex. 9 (DE 9-10). Next, petitioner filed a petition for writ of mandamus in the North Carolina Court of Appeals, which was denied on June 29, 2016. (Pet'r. Ex. (DE 1-1) at 2).

         On July 13, 2016, [2] petitioner filed the instant petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Respondent filed the instant motion to dismiss on March 23, 2017, and petitioner has responded (DE 11).

         DISCUSSION

         A. Motion to Dismiss

         1. Standard of Review

         A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) determines only whether a claim is stated; “it does not resolve contests surrounding the facts, the merits of a claim, or the applicability of defenses.” Republican Party v. Martin, 980 F.2d 943, 952 (4th Cir. 1992). A claim is stated if the complaint contains “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). In evaluating whether a claim is stated, “[the] court accepts all well-pled facts as true and construes these facts in the light most favorable to the [petitioner], ” but does not consider “legal conclusions, elements of a cause of action, . . . bare assertions devoid of further factual enhancement[, ] . . . unwarranted inferences, unreasonable conclusions, or arguments.” Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v. Consumeraffairs. com, Inc., 591 F.3d 250, 255 (4th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted). In other words, this plausibility standard requires a petitioner to articulate facts, that, when accepted as true, demonstrate that the petitioner has stated a claim that makes it plausible he is entitled to relief. Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 193 (4th Cir. 2009) (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, and Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). Moreover, a court may take judicial notice of public records without converting a motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. See Fed.R.Evid. 201; Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights. Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007); Philips v. Pitt Cnty. Mem'l Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 180 (4th Cir. 2009).

         2. Analysis

         Respondent argues that petitioner's § 2254 petition is time-barred. The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) requires that any application for a writ of habeas corpus filed by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a state court be filed within one year of the latest of certain dates. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1); see Frasch v. Peguese, 414 F.3d 518, 521 (4th Cir. 2005). The limitation period begins running from the latest of:

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;
(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the applicant was ...

Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.