United States District Court, W.D. North Carolina, Charlotte Division
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND ORDER
Reidinger, United States District Judge.
MATTER is before the Court on the Plaintiff's
Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. 7] and the Defendant's
Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. 9].
Plaintiff, Thomas Fludd (“Plaintiff”), asserts
that his degenerative disc disease, osteoarthritis, allied
disorder, history of polysubstance abuse, and bipolar
disorder constitute severe mental and physical impairments
under the Social Security Act (the “Act”)
rendering him disabled. On March 6, 2012, the Plaintiff filed
an application for supplemental security income benefits
under Title XVI of the Act, alleging an onset date of
September 30, 2007. [Transcript (“T.”) at 220].
On February 5, 2013, the Plaintiff filed an application for
disability insurance benefits under Title II of the Act,
alleging a date of onset of January 1, 2003. [T. at 207]. The
Plaintiff's applications were denied initially and upon
reconsideration. [T. at 131, 136, 143, 147]. Upon
Plaintiff's request, a hearing was held on September 1,
2015, before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”).
[T. at 35-83]. Present at the hearing were the Plaintiff;
George Piemonte, the Plaintiff's attorney; and a
vocational expert (“VE”). [Id.]. On
October 28, 2015, the ALJ issued a decision, wherein the ALJ
concluded that the Plaintiff was not disabled. [T. at 21-30].
On November 29, 2016, the Appeals Council denied the
Plaintiff's request for review [T. at 1], thereby making
the ALJ's decision the final decision of the
Commissioner. The Plaintiff has exhausted all available
administrative remedies, and this case is now ripe for review
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Court's review of a final decision of the Commissioner is
limited to (1) whether substantial evidence supports the
Commissioner's decision, Richardson v. Perales,
402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); and (2) whether the Commissioner
applied the correct legal standards, Hays v.
Sullivan, 907 F.2d 1453, 1456 (4th Cir. 1990).
“When examining [a Social Security Administration]
disability determination, a reviewing court is required to
uphold the determination when an ALJ has applied correct
legal standards and the ALJ's factual findings are
supported by substantial evidence.” Bird v.
Comm'r, 699 F.3d 337, 340 (4th Cir. 2012).
“Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.” Johnson v. Barnhart, 434 F.3d
650, 653 (4th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted).
“It consists of more than a mere scintilla of evidence
but may be less than a preponderance.” Hancock v.
Astrue, 667 F.3d 470, 472 (4th Cir. 2012) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
reviewing for substantial evidence, [the Court should] not
undertake to reweigh conflicting evidence, make credibility
determinations, or substitute [its] judgment for that of the
ALJ.” Johnson, 434 F.3d at 653 (internal
quotation marks and alteration omitted). Rather,
“[w]here conflicting evidence allows reasonable minds
to differ, ” the Court defers to the ALJ's
decision. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). To
enable judicial review for substantial evidence, “[t]he
record should include a discussion of which evidence the ALJ
found credible and why, and specific application of the
pertinent legal requirements to the record evidence.”
Radford v. Colvin, 734 F.3d 288, 295 (4th Cir.
THE SEQUENTIAL EVALUATION PROCESS
“disability” entitling a claimant to benefits
under the Social Security Act, as relevant here, is
“[the] inability to engage in any substantial gainful
activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or
mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or
which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous
period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. §
423(d)(1)(A). The Social Security Administration regulations
set out a detailed five-step process for reviewing
applications for disability. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520,
416.920; Mascio v. Colvin, 780 F.3d 632, 634 (4th
Cir. 2015). “If an applicant's claim fails at any
step of the process, the ALJ need not advance to the
subsequent steps.” Pass v. Chater, 65 F.3d
1200, 1203 (4th Cir. 1995) (citation omitted). The burden is
on the claimant to make the requisite showing at the first
four steps. Id.
one, the ALJ determines whether the claimant is engaged in
substantial gainful activity. If so, the claimant's
application is denied regardless of the medical condition,
age, education, or work experience of the claimant.
Id. (citing 20 C.F.R. § 416.920). If not, the
case progresses to step two, where the claimant must show a
severe impairment. If the claimant does not show any physical
or mental deficiencies, or a combination thereof, which
significantly limit the claimant's ability to perform
work activities, then no severe impairment is established and
the claimant is not disabled. Id.
three, the ALJ must determine whether one or more of the
claimant's impairments meets or equals one of the listed
impairments (“Listings”) found at 20 C.F.R. 404,
Appendix 1 to Subpart P. If so, the claimant is automatically
deemed disabled regardless of age, education or work
experience. Id. If not, before proceeding to step
four, the ALJ must assess the claimant's residual
functional capacity (“RFC”). The RFC is an
administrative assessment of “the most” a
claimant can still do on a “regular and continuing
basis” notwithstanding the claimant's medically
determinable impairments and the extent to which those
impairments affect the claimant's ability to perform
work-related functions. SSR 96-8p; 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1546(c); 404.943(c); 416.945.
four, the claimant must show that his or her limitations
prevent the claimant from performing his or her past work. 20
C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920; Mascio, 780
F.3d at 634. If the claimant can still perform his or her
past work, then the claimant is not disabled. Id.
Otherwise, the case progresses to the fifth step where the
burden shifts to the Commissioner. At step five, the
Commissioner must establish that, given the claimant's
age, education, work experience, and RFC, the claimant can
perform alternative work which exists in substantial numbers
in the national economy. Id.; Hines v.
Barnhart, 453 F.3d 559, 567 (4th Cir. 2006). “The
Commissioner typically offers this evidence through the
testimony of a vocational expert responding to a hypothetical
that incorporates the claimant's limitations.” 20
C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920; Mascio, 780
F.3d at 635. If the Commissioner succeeds in shouldering her
burden at step five, the claimant is not disabled and the
application for benefits must be denied. Id.
Otherwise, the claimant is entitled to benefits. In this
case, the ALJ rendered determinations adverse to the
Plaintiff at step four and, in the alternative, at step five.
THE ALJ'S DECISION
one, the ALJ found that Plaintiff has not engaged in
substantial gainful activity since his amended alleged onset
date, September 23, 2004. [T. at 23]. At step two, the ALJ
found that the Plaintiff has severe impairments including
degenerative disc disease, osteoarthritis, allied disorder,
and history of polysubstance abuse. [Id.]. At this
stage, the ALJ also found Plaintiff's impairment of
bipolar disorder to be nonsevere for Title II and Title XVI
purposes. [T. at 24]. At step three, the ALJ determined that
the Plaintiff does not have an impairment or combination of
impairments that meets or medically equals the Listings.
[Id.]. The ALJ then determined that the Plaintiff,
notwithstanding his impairments, has the RFC:
[T]o perform medium work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) and
416.967(b) except the claimant can frequently climb ramps,
stairs, ladders, ropes and scaffolds; and claimant is limited
to only frequent balancing, stooping, kneeling, crouching and
[Id. at 25].
identified Plaintiff's past relevant work as a carpenter,
painter, prep cook, grill cook, and seafood clerk.
[Id. at 28]. The ALJ found, after reviewing all of
the evidence, including the testimony of the VE, that
Plaintiff “could perform his past relevant work as a
painter, prep cook, grill cook and seafood clerk given his
residual functional capacity.” [Id. at 29].
The ALJ then proceeded to make alternative findings at step
five. [Id.]. Based upon the testimony of the
VE, the ALJ concluded that, considering
Plaintiff's age, education, work experience, and RFC,
Plaintiff is capable of performing other jobs that exist in
significant numbers in the national economy, including
cleaner, hand packer, and auto detailer. [Id.]. The
ALJ therefore concluded that the ...