United States District Court, M.D. North Carolina
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Loretta C. Biggs, United States District Judge
Plaintiff,
Annie Boone, initiated this action against Defendant, the
Board of Governors of the University of North Carolina
(“UNC”), alleging four claims: (1) failure to
accommodate under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities
Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12131 et seq.; (2)
failure to accommodate under the Rehabilitation Act, 29
U.S.C. § 794 et seq.; (3) retaliation under the Family
and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”), 29 U.S.C. §
2601 et seq.; and, as an alternative to her first and second
claims, (4) interference under the FMLA, 29 U.S.C. §
2601 et seq. (ECF No. 1.) Before the Court is Defendant's
Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint. (ECF No. 11.)
For the reasons set forth below, Defendant's motion will
be granted in part and denied in part.
I.
BACKGROUND
According
to Plaintiff's Complaint, she was employed by UNC, on or
around April 23, 2012, as a campus police officer. (ECF No. 1
¶ 9.) On or around Memorial Day in 2015, Plaintiff was
raped by a “supposed ‘friend'” whom she
was visiting in South Carolina. (Id. ¶¶
13-14.) Plaintiff “did not report the rape to
authorities, and she did not inform anyone at UNC that she
had been raped.” (Id. ¶ 15.) As a result
of the rape, Plaintiff alleges that she has been
“diagnosed with a post-traumatic stress response,
anxiety, and depression.” (Id. ¶ 16.)
According to Plaintiff, these conditions “significantly
impair” her ability to work, sleep, and think, among
other things. (Id.)
“On
or around August 21, 2015, [Plaintiff] told a co-worker . . .
something to the effect that her head was not ‘in the
game.'” (Id. ¶ 18.) This information
was allegedly reported “up the chain of command,
” and on August 22, 2015, Plaintiff was called into a
meeting with her superiors. (Id. ¶ 19, 20.)
During the meeting, Plaintiff was told by her superiors
“that they were aware she was having problems, and
suggested that she take FMLA leave.” (Id.
¶ 20.)
One
week later, on August 28, 2015, Plaintiff was notified by UNC
“that she was being placed on investigatory status
regarding her attendance at a training symposium 11 days
prior, ” and that “she would have to undergo a
Fitness for Duty examination” to determine her ability
to return to work as a police officer. (Id. ¶
22.) Plaintiff submitted to the “mandatory Fitness for
Duty examination . . . with The FMRT Group, a company that
provides psychological evaluations for law enforcement
agencies.” (Id. ¶ 23.)
On or
around September 30, 2015, Plaintiff was informed by
UNC's human resources department “that she was no
longer under investigation and could submit her FMLA
paperwork.” (Id. ¶ 25.) Plaintiff
“submitted her FMLA paperwork to UNC on or around
October 26, 2015.” (Id. ¶ 26.) On
November 6, 2015, UNC approved Plaintiff's request for
FMLA leave from September 28, 2015 through December 18,
2015.[1] (Id. ¶ 27.)
One day
before the expiration of Plaintiff's FMLA leave period,
“[o]n or around December 17, 2015, ” Plaintiff
“called her chief regarding her return to work [and h]e
told her that she could return after the new year.”
(Id. ¶ 28.) After the new year, on January 4,
2016, she told UNC “that she was cleared by her doctor
to return to work and provided a doctor's note certifying
her fitness for duty.” (Id. ¶ 29.)
Plaintiff alleges that “UNC did not accept” the
fitness-for-duty letter from her doctor, “instead
returning [Plaintiff] to [t]he FMRT Group” for
evaluation on or around January 8, 2016. (Id. ¶
31.) The FMRT Group then notified UNC that Plaintiff
“was unfit to return to work, ” and on or around
January 22, 2016, UNC informed Plaintiff “that she was
unable to return from FMLA leave.” (Id. ¶
32.)
Plaintiff
alleges that she then asked UNC for “leave or light
duty as a reasonable accommodation.” (Id.
¶ 33.) Plaintiff further alleges that she
“submitted paperwork to UNC certifying that she had a
disability related to mental health brought on by a personal
trauma.” (Id.) According to the Complaint, UNC
nonetheless “demanded that [Plaintiff] provide
documents from her doctor . . . stating that [she] was
disabled and required accommodation.” (Id.
¶ 36.) Plaintiff alleges that her doctor “claimed
that [she] was fit to return to work and therefore would not
certify that she was disabled.” (Id. ¶
38.) Plaintiff claims that UNC refused to “use the
FMR[T] interview conclusions as the requisite medical
certification that she was disabled, ” (id.
¶ 37), and she was subsequently terminated by UNC,
(id. ¶ 39).[2] Plaintiff filed the instant lawsuit
seeking compensatory and punitive damages. (Id.
¶¶ 64-65.) Defendant has moved to dismiss
Plaintiff's request for punitive damages, as well as each
of Plaintiff's claims for failure to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (ECF No. 11.)
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A
motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure “challenges the legal sufficiency of a
complaint, ” Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d
186, 192 (4th Cir. 2009); “it does not resolve contests
surrounding the facts, the merits of a claim, or the
applicability of defenses.” Republican Party v.
Martin, 980 F.2d 943, 952 (4th Cir. 1992).
“To
survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state
a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
(2007)). A complaint may fail to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted in two ways: first, by failing to state
a valid legal cause of action, i.e., a cognizable claim, see
Holloway v. Pagan River Dockside Seafood, Inc., 669
F.3d 448, 452 (4th Cir. 2012); or second, by failing to
allege sufficient facts to support a legal cause of action,
see Painter's Mill Grille, LLC v. Brown, 716
F.3d 342, 350 (4th Cir. 2013). In evaluating whether a claim
is stated, “[the] court accepts all well-pled facts as
true and construes these facts in the light most favorable to
the plaintiff, ” but does not consider “legal
conclusions, elements of a cause of action, . . . bare
assertions devoid of further factual enhancement[, ] . . .
unwarranted inferences, unreasonable conclusions, or
arguments.” Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v.
Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 591 F.3d 250, 255 (4th Cir.
2009).
III.
DISCUSSION
A.
Claim 1 - Failure to Accommodate under Title II of the ADA
(“Title II”)
UNC
argues that Plaintiff's ADA claim fails as a matter of
law and “should be dismissed because Plaintiff is
unable to bring a claim of [public] employment discrimination
under Title II.” (ECF No. 12 at 6.) The Court agrees.
Under
Title II, it is unlawful to discriminate against a
“qualified individual with a disability” in
“the services, programs, or activities of a public
entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132. Prior to the Fourth
Circuit's decision in Reyazuddin v. Montgomery
Cty.,789 F.3d 407 (4th Cir. 2015), courts were divided
as to whether Title II of the ADA applied to public
employment discrimination claims. See Id. at 419-20
(noting circuit split). In Reyazuddin, however, the
Fourth Circuit joined “the majority of circuits to have
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