United States District Court, W.D. North Carolina, Charlotte Division
J. CONRAD, JR. UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
MATTER is before the Court on an initial review of
Plaintiff's Complaint, (Doc. No. 1), on Plaintiff's
Motion to Proceed in Forma Pauperis, (Doc. No. 2), and on
Plaintiff's “Motion for Recusal of Judge Conrad,
Jr., ” (Doc. No. 3).
Plaintiff Tigress Sydney Acute McDaniel, a resident of
Charlotte, North Carolina, filed this action on March 15,
2018, purportedly on her own behalf and on behalf of her
minor son, “A.M.” Plaintiff has named numerous
Defendants, including “Charlotte-Mecklenburg Schools,
” “Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education,
” administrators and teachers at various
Charlotte-Mecklenburg schools, private individuals, and an
attorney representing Charlotte-Mecklenburg Schools.
Plaintiff purports to bring an action under 42 U.S.C. §
1983, 42 U.S.C. § 1985, “Section 504 of the
Americans with Disabilities Act” (“ADA”),
various state torts, including “conspiracy and public
corruption, ” “public corruption, ”
“de facto discrimination, ” and
“negligence, ” arising out of treatment her minor
son allegedly received while attending various public schools
in Charlotte, North Carolina. Plaintiff alleges that her
minor son was under a “504” plan in the public
schools due to various medical conditions, and Defendants
committed various state law torts and violated the ADA by,
among other things, failing to properly address her son's
medical condition. (Id. at 4). As relief, Plaintiff
seeks compensatory damages, punitive damages, a “formal
apology” from Defendants, and all other forms of
“appropriate” relief. (Id. at 13).
Court first addresses Plaintiff's motion to proceed in
forma pauperis. Plaintiff's affidavit shows that she has
had a total monthly income of $3, 928 for the past twelve
months (which appears to include payments from an educational
loan), and she expects to receive the same amount in income
next month. (Doc. No. 2 at 5). Plaintiff reports that she has
$120 in cash and $120 in a checking account. (Id. at
2). Plaintiff reports total monthly expenses of $4, 004.
(Id. at 5). In explaining why she cannot pay the
costs of these proceedings, Plaintiff states, “The
absent parent . . . paid only $118 last period, as opposed to
$261.00, which is routinely paid every two weeks.”
(Id.). The Court is satisfied that Plaintiff does
not have sufficient funds to pay the filing fees. The Court
will, therefore, allow the motion and permit Plaintiff to
proceed in forma pauperis.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court must
review the Complaint to determine whether it is subject to
dismissal on the grounds that it is “frivolous or
malicious [or] fails to state a claim on which relief may be
granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Furthermore,
Secion 1915A requires an initial review of a “complaint
in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress from a
governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental
entity, ” and the Court must identify cognizable claims
or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if
the complaint is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted; or seeks monetary
relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.
frivolity review, this Court must determine whether the
Complaint raises an indisputably meritless legal theory or is
founded upon clearly baseless factual contentions, such as
fantastic or delusional scenarios. Neitzke v.
Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327-28 (1989). Furthermore, a
pro se complaint must be construed liberally. Haines v.
Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). However, the liberal
construction requirement will not permit a district court to
ignore a clear failure to allege facts in his Complaint which
set forth a claim that is cognizable under federal law.
Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387
(4th Cir. 1990).
Plaintiff's Motion to Recuse
as to Plaintiff's motion for recusal of the undersigned,
Plaintiff alleges the following in support:
There exists sufficient evidence in Judge Conrad Jr.'s
orders in response to Plaintiff's pleading that far
exceed the threshold for reasonable appearance of bias
against her. Upon information and belief, Plaintiff asserts
and alleges that Judge Conrad, Jr. has been tainted by
corrupt judicial and legal officials, and has agreeably or
alternatively been coerced to conspire with other corrupt
judicial and legal officials to subject her to unlawful
impediment by prematurely dismissing her valid claim related
to second case filed in this jurisdiction. Plaintiff asserts
that her first action filed in this jurisdiction was
adjudicated impartially, and markedly in favor for the IFP
and proceeding to trial on the merits of the case surviving
the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, under an opining that
was substantiation of her claims and no frivolity to merit
dismissal of her action. However, when Plaintiff submitted
her second action against Defendants who have knowingly,
routinely, maliciously conspired corruption against Plaintiff
for a period spanning over a decade including both a criminal
matter and civil action to execute a money judgment in her
favor, suddenly Judge Conrad, Jr.'s disposition toward
her negatively changed. Plaintiff, on behalf of her son,
asserts that she and her Son will sustain irreparable harm if
subjected to unlawful impediment at the hand of Judge Conrad,
Jr., who has exhibited unlawful bias against her. As a matter
of law and in the interest of justice, no legality is
compromised in the assignment of another judge.
See (Doc. No. 3 at 1-2). The Court will deny the
motion to recuse. A judge may be recused for personal bias or
prejudice, having a familial or fiduciary interest in the
proceeding, having personal knowledge of disputed facts, or
having a conflict of interest from his prior practice.
See 28 U.S.C. §§ 144, 455. Plaintiff has
not asserted sufficient facts setting forth grounds for
disqualification of the undersigned under either 28 U.S.C.
§ 144 or § 455. That is, Plaintiff's allegations in
support of the motion to recuse are vague, and the Court
further finds that a prior unfavorable ruling against
Plaintiff is not sufficient grounds to justify recusal.
See Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555
(1994) (noting that prior judicial rulings alone are not a
basis for a motion for recusal on the grounds of bias or
partiality). “[T]he nature of the judge's bias must
be personal and not judicial.” In re Beard,
811 F.2d 818, 827 (4th Cir. 1987). In sum, for the reasons
stated herein, the motion for recusal is denied.