Searching over 5,500,000 cases.


searching
Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

Carroll v. Berryhill

United States District Court, W.D. North Carolina, Statesville Division

April 23, 2018

EDIE BROOME CARROLL, Plaintiff,
v.
NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant.

          ORDER

          Graham C. Mullen United States District Judge.

         THIS MATTER is before the Court upon Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 10) and Commissioner's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 12). Having carefully considered the motions and reviewed the record, the court enters the following findings, conclusions, and Order.

         I. Administrative History

         Plaintiff Edie Broome Carroll (“Carroll” or “Plaintiff”) filed her application for Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) and Supplemental Security Income Benefits (“SSI”) on September 12, 2012, alleging a disability onset date of June 1, 2005. After Plaintiff's claim was denied both initially and on reconsideration, she requested and was granted a hearing. Before the hearing, Plaintiff amended her alleged onset date to October 11, 2010. Administrative Law Judge Clinton C. Hicks (“the ALJ”) held a hearing on May 17, 2015. On May 25, 2015, the ALJ issued a partially favorable decision, finding her disabled beginning on August 12, 2013. Accordingly, the ALJ found that she was entitled to SSI from that date, but he denied her application for DIB because she was not disabled through December 31, 2011, the date last insured.

         The Appeals Council subsequently denied Plaintiff's request for review, making the ALJ's decision the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”). Thereafter, Plaintiff timely filed this action, seeking judicial review of the ALJ's decision.

         II. Factual Background

         In his decision, the ALJ at the first step determined that Plaintiff did not engage in substantial gainful activity since her alleged onset date. (Tr. 23). At the second step, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff has the following severe impairments: spinal stenosis, depression, bipolar disorder, and dyssomnia. (Id.). At the third step, the ALJ found that the Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meet or medically equal the severity of one the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. § 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. (Tr. 25).

         After a consideration of the entire record, the ALJ then found that Plaintiff has the following residual functional capacity (“RFC”):

to perform sedentary work as defined in 20 C.F.R. 404.1567(a) and 416.967(a). She has the ability to sit for 45 minutes at a time and stand for two hours at a time, alternating between sitting and standing throughout the workday. She can frequently handle or finger bilaterally. She requires the use of a cane to ambulate but the cane is not needed in the performance of her work duties. She is limited to simple, routine repetitive tasks and can occasionally interact with the public.

         (Tr. 26). Based on these limitations, the ALJ found in the fourth step that Plaintiff has not been capable of performing her past relevant work since the alleged onset date. (Tr. 32). Finally, at the fifth step, the ALJ concluded that prior to August 12, 2013, when Plaintiff's age category changed to “an individual closely approaching advanced age” there were other jobs that existed in significant numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff could have performed. (Tr. 32-33).

         Accordingly, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was not disabled under the Act prior to August 12, 2013, but that Plaintiff has been disabled under the Act since August 12, 2013. (Tr. 34).

         III. Standard of Review

         The only issues on review are whether the Commissioner applied the correct legal standards and whether the Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 390 (1971); Hays v. Sullivan, 907 F.2d 1453, 1456 (4th Cir. 1990). Review by a federal court is not de novo, Smith v. Schweiker, 795 F.2d 343, 345 (4th Cir. 1986); rather, inquiry is limited to whether there was “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, ” Richardson, 402 U.S. at 400. Even if the undersigned were to find that a preponderance of the evidence weighed against the Commissioner's decision, the Commissioner's decision would have to be affirmed if supported by substantial evidence. Hays, 907 F.2d at 1456.

         IV. ...


Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.