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Allen v. Berryhill

United States District Court, E.D. North Carolina, Western Division

January 16, 2019

SHARON ALLEN, Plaintiff,
NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant.


          James E. Gates, United States Magistrate Judge

         In this action, plaintiff Sharon Allen ("plaintiff or, in context, "claimant") challenges the final decision of defendant Acting Commissioner of Social Security Nancy A. Berryhill ("Commissioner") denying her application /for a period of disability and disability insurance benefits ("DIB") on the grounds that she is not disabled. The case is before the court on the parties' motions for judgment on the pleadings. D.E. 18, 23. Both filed memoranda in support of their respective motions. D.E. 19, 24. The motions were referred to the undersigned magistrate judge for a memorandum and recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). See 12 Dec. 2018 Text Ord. For the reasons set forth below, it will be recommended that plaintiffs motion be allowed, the Commissioner's motion be denied, and this case be remanded.

         I. CASE HISTORY

         Plaintiff filed an application for DIB on 3 May 2013, alleging a disability onset date of 6 April 2013. Transcript of Proceedings ("Tr.") 11. The application was denied initially and upon reconsideration, and a request for a hearing was timely filed. Tr. 11. On 26 October 2016, a hearing was held before an administrative law judge ("ALJ") at which plaintiff, who was represented by counsel, and a vocational expert testified. Tr. 11, 31-85. On 28 November 2016, the ALJ issued a decision denying plaintiffs application. Tr. 11-25.

         Plaintiff timely requested review by the Appeals Council. Tr. 184, 186. On 22 August 2017, the Appeals Council denied the request for review. Tr. 1. At that time, the ALJ's decision became the final decision of the Commissioner. 20 C.F.R. § 404.981.[1] On 26 October 2017, plaintiff commenced this proceeding for judicial review of the ALJ's decision, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). See Mot. to Proceed In Forma Pauperis ("IFP") (D.E. 1); Ord. Denying IFP Mot. (D.E. 4); Compl. (D.E. 5).


         The Social Security Act ("Act") defines disability as the "inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A); Pass v. Chater, 65 F.3d 1200, 1203 (4th Cir. 1995). "An individual shall be determined to be under a disability only if his physical or mental impairment or impairments are of such severity that he is not only unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A). The Act defines a physical or mental impairment as "an impairment that results from anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities which are demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques." Id. § 423(d)(3).

         The disability regulations under the Act ("Regulations") provide a five-step analysis that the ALJ must follow when determining whether a claimant is disabled:

To summarize, the ALJ asks at step one whether the claimant has been working; at step two, whether the claimant's medical impairments meet the [Regulations' severity and duration requirements; at step three, whether the medical impairments meet or equal an impairment listed in the [R]egulations; at step four, whether the claimant can perform her past work given the limitations caused by her medical impairments; and at step five, whether the claimant can perform other work.
The first four steps create a series of hurdles for claimants to meet. If the ALJ finds that the claimant has been working (step one) or that the claimant's medical impairments do not meet the severity and duration requirements of the [R]egulations (step two), the process ends with a finding of "not disabled." At step three, the ALJ either finds that the claimant is disabled because her impairments match a listed impairment [i.e., a listing in 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1 ("the Listings")] or continues the analysis. The ALJ cannot deny benefits at this step. If the first three steps do not lead to a conclusive determination, the ALJ then assesses the claimant's residual functional capacity ["RFC"], which is "the most" the claimant "can still do despite" physical and mental limitations that affect her ability to work. [20 C.F.R.] § 416.945(a)(1).[2] To make this assessment, the ALJ must "consider all of [the claimant's] medically determinable impairments of which [the ALJ is] aware," including those not labeled severe at step two. Id. § 416.945(a)(2).[3]
The ALJ then moves on to step four, where the ALJ can find the claimant not disabled because she is able to perform her past work. Or, if the exertion required for the claimant's past work exceeds her [RFC], the ALJ goes on to step five.
At step five, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the claimant can perform other work that "exists in significant numbers in the national economy," considering the claimant's [RFC], age, education, and work experience. Id. §§ 416.920(a)(4)(v); 416.960(c)(2); 416.1429.4 The Commissioner typically offers this evidence through the testimony of a vocational expert responding to a hypothetical that incorporates the claimant's limitations. If the Commissioner meets her burden, the ALJ finds the claimant not disabled and denies the application for benefits.

Mascio v. Colvin, 780 F.3d 632, 634-35 (4th Cir. 2015).


         Plaintiff was 50 years old on the alleged disability onset date and 54 years old on the date of the hearing and issuance of the ALJ's decision. Tr. 24 ¶ 7; 36. The ALJ found that she has at least a high school education (Tr. 24 ¶ 8)[5] and past relevant work as a program analyst, logistics specialist/logistics technician, and maintenance and material manager (Tr. 23 ¶ 6).

         Applying the five-step analysis of 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4), the ALJ found at step one that plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since 6 April 2013, the alleged disability onset date. Tr. 13 ¶ 2. At step two, the ALJ found that plaintiff had the following medically determinable impairments that were severe within the meaning of the Regulations: degenerative joint disease, status-post surgeries of the left knee; carpal tunnel syndrome; hypertension; hiatal hernia; irritable bowel syndrome; migraines; nonobstructive coronary artery disease; cardiac-related syncope; degenerative disc disease; depression/major depressive disorder; and post-traumatic stress disorder ("PTSD"). Tr. 13 ¶ 3. At step three, the ALJ found that plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals any of the Listings. Tr. 14 ¶ 4.

         The ALJ next determined that plaintiff had the RFC to perform a limited range of work at the light exertional level, as follows:

After careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned finds the claimant has the [RFC] to perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b), [6] with the following provisos: the claimant can occasionally climb ramps and stairs, but no climbing ladders, ropes, or scaffolds. The claimant can occasionally balance, stoop, kneel, and/or crouch, but no crawling. The claimant can occasionally push, pull and/or operate foot controls with the lower extremities. The claimant must avoid concentrated exposure to workplace hazards, such as dangerous moving machinery and unprotected heights. The claimant can understand and perform simple, routine, repetitive tasks, and she can maintain concentration, persistence, and pace to remain on task for 2 hour periods over a typical 8-hour workday, in a low stress setting, further defined to mean no production-pace or quota-based work, rather she requires a goal-oriented job primarily dealing with things rather than people, with no more than occasional social interaction with supervisors and/or co-workers, no work with the public as part of job, such as sales or negotiation, though incidental or casual contact with the public as it might arise is not precluded.

Tr. 17 ¶ 5.

         Based on his determination of plaintiff s RFC, the ALJ found at step four that plaintiff was unable to perform her past relevant work. Tr. 23 ¶ 6. At step five, citing the testimony of the vocational expert, the ALJ found that there were jobs in the national economy existing in significant numbers that plaintiff could perform, including jobs in the occupations of housekeeper, clerical assistant, and inspector/hand packager. Tr. 24-25 ¶ 10. The ALJ accordingly concluded that plaintiff ...

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