United States District Court, E.D. North Carolina, Eastern Division
ORDER
TERRENCE W. BOYLE CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
This
matter is before the Court on the parties' cross-motions
for judgment on the pleadings [DE 17, 19]. The motions have
been fully briefed and are ripe for disposition. A hearing on
this matter was held in Elizabeth City, North Carolina on
January 23, 2019. For the reasons discussed below, plaintiffs
motion for judgment on the pleadings [DE 17] is GRANTED and
defendant's motion [DE 19] is DENIED.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff
brought this action under 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and
1383(c)(3) for review of the final decision of the
Commissioner denying her claim for a period of disability and
disability insurance benefits (DIB) under Title II and
supplemental security income (SSI) benefits under Title XVI
of the Social Security Act. Plaintiff filed her application
on July 9, 2014, alleging disability dating back to December
11, 2009. Plaintiffs application was denied both initially
and upon reconsideration. A hearing was held before an
administrative law judge (ALJ) on July 27, 2016, at which
plaintiff appeared and testified. The ALJ issued a decision
in September 2016, finding that plaintiff was not disabled.
In October 2013, the Appeals Council denied plaintiffs
request for review, making the ALJ's decision the final
administrative decision of the Commissioner.
In
November 2017, plaintiff filed the complaint at issue,
seeking judicial review of the Commissioner's final
decision under 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3).
[DE 6]. In April 2018, plaintiff moved for judgment on the
pleadings. [DE 17]. Defendant moved for judgment on the
pleadings in June 2018. [DE 19].
DISCUSSION
Under
the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. "§§ 405(g)
and 1383(c)(3), this Court's review of the
Commissioner's decision is limited to determining whether
the decision, as a whole, is supported by substantial
evidence and whether the Commissioner employed the correct
legal standard. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389,
401 (1971). Substantial evidence is "such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion." Johnson v. Barnhart, 434
F.3d 650, 653 (4th Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (internal
quotation and citation omitted). Courts should not make their
own credibility determinations or substitute their own
judgments for the judgments of the ALJs. Radford v.
Colvin, 734 F.3d 288, 296 (4th Cir. 2013).
An
individual is considered disabled if he is unable "to
engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any
medically determinable physical or mental impairment which
can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can
be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than
[twelve] months." 42 U.S.C. § l382c(a)(3)(A). The
Act further provides that an individual "shall be
determined to be under a disability only if his physical or
mental impairment or impairments are of such severity that he
is not only unable to do his previous work but cannot,
considering his age, education, and work experience, engage
in any other line of substantial gainful work which exists in
the national economy." 42 U.S.C § l382c(a)(3)(B).
Regulations
issued by the Commissioner establish a five-step sequential
evaluation process to be followed in a disability case. 20
C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4). In making
a disability determination, the ALJ engages in a sequential
five-step evaluation process. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520;
see Johnson, 434 F.3d at 653. At step one, if the
claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful
activity, the claim is denied. At step two, the claim is
denied if the claimant does not have a severe impairment or
combination of impairments significantly limiting him or her
from performing basic work activities. At step three, the
claimant's impairment is compared to those in the Listing
of Impairments (Listing). See 20 C.F.R. Part 404,
Subpart P, App. 1. If the impairment is included in the
Listing or is equivalent to a listed impairment, disability
is conclusively presumed. If the claimant's impairment
does not meet or equal a listed impairment, then the analysis
proceeds to step four, where the claimant's residual
functional capacity is assessed to determine whether
plaintiff can perform his past work despite his impairments.
If the claimant cannot perform past relevant work, the
analysis moves on to step five: establishing whether the
claimant, based on his age, work experience, and residual
functional capacity can perform other substantial gainful
work. The burden of proof is on the claimant for the first
four steps of this inquiry, but shifts to the Commissioner at
the fifth step. Pass v. Chater, 65 F.3d 1200, 1203
(4th Cir. 1995). The claimant bears the burden of proof at
steps one through four, but the burden shifts to the
Commissioner at step five. See Bowen v. Yuckert, 482
U.S. 137, 146 n.5 (1987). If a decision regarding disability
can be made at any step of the process, then the inquiry
ceases. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4),
416.920(a)(4). Here, the analysis ended at step four when the
ALJ considered plaintiffs residual functional capacity and
determined that plaintiff was capable of performing her past
work.
Plaintiff
argues, and the Court agrees, that the AL J erred in
determining that plaintiff had the residual functional
capacity to perform medium work and, therefore, her past
relevant work. In determining a claimant's residual
functional capacity, an ALJ must consider the claimant's
"ability to meet the physical, mental, sensory, and
other requirements of work." 20 C.F.R. §
404.1545(a). The assessment is based on all relevant evidence
and may include a claimant's own description of
limitations, such as pain. Id.
"Medium
work involves lifting no more than 50 pounds at a time with
frequent lifting or carrying of objects weighing up to 25
pounds. If someone can do medium work, we determine that he
or she can also do sedentary and light work." 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1567(c). "Light work involves lifting no more
than 20 pounds at a time with frequent lifting or carrying of
objects weighing up to 10 pounds," or work that is
mostly sedentary but involves "a good deal of walking or
standing." 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b). "Sedentary
work involves lifting no more than 10 pounds at a time,"
but can also require some standing or walking. 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1567(a). In this case, the ALJ determined that
plaintiff was capable of performing medium work, and
therefore sedentary and light work, as well.
Social
Security Ruling 96-8p directs ALJs to "first identify
the individual's functional limitations or restrictions
and assess his or her work-related abilities on a
function-by-function basis" before determining the level
of work the claimant can perform. See Monroe v.
Colvin, 826 F.3d 176, 179 (4th Cir. 2016). Social
Security Ruling 82-62 provides, in relevant part, that
"[d]etermination of the claimant's ability to do
[past relevant work] requires a careful appraisal of (1) the
individual's statements as to which past work
requirements can no longer be met and the reason(s) for his
or her inability to meet those requirements; (2) medical
evidence establishing how the impairment limits ability to
meet the physical and mental requirements of the work; and
(3) in some cases, supplementary or corroborative information
from other sources." The ALJ did not perform a
function-by-function analysis in this case. Defendant argues,
however, that the ALJ still provided sufficient explanation
for review of the decision. The ALJ ultimately determined
that plaintiff could perform medium work and, therefore, her
past relevant work as a tire inspector, resulting in a
finding that she was not disabled within the meaning of the
Act.
Remand
is appropriate, however, because the ALJ's finding that
plaintiff could perform medium work was not supported by
substantial evidence. There are two particular limitations,
which plaintiff claims resulting in her leaving her job as a
tire inspector, that the ALJ failed to discuss: (1)
plaintiffs need for frequent restroom breaks as a result of
her irritable bowel syndrome and abdominal pain and (2)
plaintiffs lifting restrictions as a result of her chronic
back pain and disc bulging. Plaintiff testified that she was
required to lift tires, inspect them, place them on a pallet,
and then use a forklift to move the pallet to a warehouse.
[Tr. 32-33]. She testified that she was required to lift up
to 45 pounds and was expected to inspect nearly six hundred
tires per shift. Id. Additionally, she testified
that her stomach and back pain were the cause of her
departure from her job. Id. In this case, the record
does not demonstrate a careful appraisal of plaintiff s
statements regarding her limitations, in particular her
irritable bowel syndrome and her chronic back pain, and the
effect that those limitations have on her ability to perform
her past relevant work as a tire inspector. The ALJ also did
not take testimony from the vocational expert, who was
present at the hearing, before determining that plaintiff was
capable of performing her past relevant work. Thus, the
ALJ's decision must be reversed and remanded for further
proceedings in order to reassess plaintiffs residual
functional capacity and her ability to perform past relevant
work.
Plaintiff
also argues that the ALJ erred in discounting the credibility
of plaintiff s statements about her own limitations. While
the ALJ is required to consider plaintiffs statements, those
statements must be considered alongside the medical evidence
and the record as a whole. Given that the ALJ's failure
to conduct a function-by-function analysis and discuss all of
the relevant evidence of plaintiff s limitations, including
her statements as to the severity of her stomach and back
pain, is sufficient to require remand, there is no need to
consider whether the ALJ ...