United States District Court, E.D. North Carolina, Southern Division
ELIZABETH L. WITMER, Plaintiff,
v.
NANCY A. BERRYHILL Acting Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant.
ORDER
TERRENCE W. BOYLE, CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
This
matter is before the Court on the parties' cross-motions
for judgment on the pleadings. [DE 16, 18]. The motions have
been fully briefed and are ripe for disposition. A hearing on
this matter was held in Elizabeth City, North Carolina on
March 5, 2019. For the reasons discussed below, plaintiffs
motion for judgment on the pleadings [DE 16] is DENIED and
defendant's motion [DE 18] is GRANTED.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff
brought this action under 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and
1383(c)(3) for review of the final decision of the
Commissioner denying her claim for a period of disability and
disability insurance benefits (DIB) under Title II of the
Social Security Act. Plaintiff filed her application on March
6, 2014, alleging disability dating back to September 28,
2011. Plaintiffs application was denied both initially and
upon reconsideration. A hearing was held before an
administrative law judge (ALJ) on February 8, 2017, and then
a second hearing was held on June 2, 2017. The ALJ issued a
decision on June 22, 2017, finding that plaintiff was not
disabled. On August 31, 2017, the Appeals Council denied
plaintiffs request for review, making the ALJ's decision
the final administrative decision of the Commissioner.
In
October 2017, plaintiff filed the complaint at issue, seeking
judicial review of the Commissioner's final decision
under 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3). [DE 5].
In February 2018, plaintiff moved for judgment on the
pleadings. [DE 16]. Defendant moved for judgment on the
pleadings in April 2018. [DE 18]. A hearing was held before
the undersigned in Elizabeth City, North Carolina on March 5,
2019. [DE 22].
DISCUSSION
Under
the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), and
1383(c)(3), this Court's review of the Commissioner's
decision is limited to determining whether the decision, as a
whole, is supported by substantial evidence and whether the
Commissioner employed the correct legal standard.
Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971).
Substantial evidence is "such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion." Johnson v. Barnhart, 434 F.3d 650,
653 (4th Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (internal quotation and
citation omitted).
An
individual is considered disabled if he is unable "to
engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any
medically determinable physical or mental impairment which
can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can
be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than
[twelve] months." 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A). The
Act further provides that an individual "shall be
determined to be under a disability only if his physical or
mental impairment or impairments are of such severity that he
is not only unable to do his previous work but cannot,
considering his age, education, and work experience, engage
in any other line of substantial gainful work which exists in
the national economy." 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(B).
Regulations
issued by the Commissioner establish a five-step sequential
evaluation process to be followed in a disability case. 20
C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4). In making
a disability determination, the ALJ engages in a sequential
five-step evaluation process. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520;
see Johnson, 434 F.3d at 653. At step one, if the
claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful
activity, the claim is denied. At step two, the claim is
denied if the claimant does not have a severe impairment or
combination of impairments significantly limiting him or her
from performing basic work activities. At step three, the
claimant's impairment is compared to those in the Listing
of Impairments (Listing). See 20 C.F.R. Part 404,
Subpart P, App. 1. If the impairment is included in the
Listing or is equivalent to a listed impairment, disability
is conclusively presumed. If the claimant's impairment
does not meet or equal a listed impairment, then the analysis
proceeds to step four, where the claimant's residual
functional capacity (RFC) is assessed to determine whether
plaintiff can perform his past work despite his impairments.
If the claimant cannot perform past relevant work, the
analysis moves on to step five: establishing whether the
claimant, based on his age, work experience, and residual
functional capacity can perform other substantial gainful
work. The burden of proof is on the claimant for the first
four steps of this inquiry, but shifts to the Commissioner at
the fifth step. Pass v. Chater, 65 F.3d 1200, 1203
(4th Cir. 1995). The claimant bears the burden of proof at
steps one through four, but the burden shifts to the
Commissioner at step five. See Bowen v. Yuckert, 482
U.S. 137, 146 n.5 (1987). If a decision regarding disability
can be made at any step of the process, then the inquiry
ceases. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4),
416.920(a)(4).
Here,
the analysis ended at step five when the ALJ considered
plaintiffs residual functional capacity and determined that,
although plaintiff was unable to perform her past relevant
work activities, she was able to perform other jobs that
existed in significant numbers in the national economy. The
ALJ concluded that plaintiff had severe impairments that did
not meet or equal any Listings and that plaintiff was capable
of performing light work with some exertional and non-
exertional limitations. At issue is whether the ALJ properly
considered the medical opinions of two of plaintiff s
treating sources.
In
deciding whether a claimant is disabled, an ALJ must always
consider the medical opinions in the case record together
with the rest of the relevant evidence received. 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1527(a)(2)(b),
416.927(a)(2)(b).[1] A medical opinion is a statement
"from physicians and psychologists or other acceptable
medical sources that reflect judgments about the nature and
severity of [a claimant's] impairment(s), including [the
claimant's] symptoms, diagnosis and prognosis, what [she]
can still do despite impairment(s), and [her] physical or
mental restrictions." 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(a)(2).
Treating source opinions are entitled to controlling weight
if they are "well supported by medically acceptable
clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and [are] not
inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in [the]
case record." 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d)(2),
416.927(d)(2); see also Craig v. Chater, 76 F.3d
585, 590 (4th Cir. 1996). Factors that ALJs consider in
determining how much weight to afford a medical opinion
include (1) the examining relationship, (2) the treatment
relationship, (3) the supportability of the opinion, (4) the
consistency of the opinion with the record as a whole, (5)
the physician's specialization, and (6) other relevant
factors, 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c).
The
Court finds that the ALJ's decision was supported by
substantial evidence in the record. Plaintiff argues that the
ALJ erred in giving little weight to the opinions of Ms.
Vonda Gardner, a licensed social worker, and Ms. Jessica
Hardin, a physician's assistant, both of whom treated
plaintiff. But the ALJ identified and discussed each of the
opinions that plaintiff identified, considering the opinions
in conjunction with the relevant medical evidence in the
record and concluding that because "the evidence
show[ed] that the claimant's mood and mental health
symptoms were relatively stable with medication," the
opinions were inconsistent with the record. [Tr. 20-21]. The
ALJ also found that the severity of the findings in the
opinions given by Ms. Gardner and Ms. Hardin were belied by
the milder findings present in the treatment notes and
examination findings. Id. The ALJ cited extensively
to the medical facts in the record in support of his
findings. Plaintiffs own testimony at her hearings, as well
as treatment notes describing her mood and symptoms,
supported the ALJ's findings that-with some exceptions
that the ALJ made note of-plaintiffs depressive symptoms were
"diminished" and she "remained stable"
while complying with her medication and treatment. [Tr. 16].
Additionally, the ALJ properly discounted the medical
opinions that opined on the ultimate issue of whether
plaintiff was able to work. Because the ALJ's decision
was supported by substantial evidence and there was no
reversible legal error, the decision must be affirmed.
Upon a
full review of the record, the Court finds that the ALJ
committed no reversible error. Substantial evidence existed
to support the ALJ's findings that plaintiff had not
engaged in substantial gainful activity, had severe
impairments that did nonetheless did not equal any regulatory
listings, could perform light work with certain limitations,
could not perform her past relevant work, and could perform
other ...