United States District Court, W.D. North Carolina, Charlotte Division
MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION
C. KEESLER UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
MATTER IS BEFORE THE COURT on “Defendant's
Partial Motion To Dismiss Plaintiff's Amended
Complaint” (Document No. 12). This motion has been
referred to the undersigned Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28
U.S.C. §636(b), and is now ripe for disposition. Having
carefully considered the arguments, the record, and the
applicable authority, the undersigned will respectfully
recommend that the motion be granted in part and
denied in part.
Derrick Newson (“Plaintiff” or
“Newson”) initiated this action with the filing
of a “Complaint” (Document No. 1) on May 22,
2018. The original Complaint asserted claims against
Plaintiff's employer, Defendant Prinston Pharmaceutical
Inc. (“Defendant” or “Prinston”), for
violation of the Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C.
§ 2601, et seq. (“FMLA”) and
violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. § 2000(e), et seq. (“Title
VII”). (Document No. 1). Defendant's first
“Motion To Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint”
(Document No. 3) was filed on August 6, 2018.
Newson then filed an “Amended Complaint”
(Document No. 7) on August 20, 2018. The Amended Complaint
asserts the same FMLA and Title VII claims as the original
Complaint, and adds claims for discrimination in violation of
the Americans With Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. et seq.
(“ADA”) and wrongful termination in violation of
public policy pursuant to the common law of North Carolina.
(Document No. 7). Based on Plaintiff's amended pleading,
the undersigned issued an “Order” (Document No.
10) on August 30, 2018, directing that Defendant's
“Motion To Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint”
(Document No. 3) be denied as moot.
pending before the Court is “Defendant's Partial
Motion To Dismiss Plaintiff's Amended Complaint”
(Document No. 12), filed on September 4, 2018. Defendant
seeks dismissal of Counts II-IV in the Amended Complaint
pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). (Document No. 12).
pending motion has been fully briefed and is ripe for review
and a recommendation to the Honorable Robert J. Conrad, Jr.
See (Document Nos. 12, 13, 14, and 16).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) tests the
“legal sufficiency of the complaint” but
“does not resolve contests surrounding the facts, the
merits of a claim, or the applicability of defenses.”
Republican Party of N.C. v. Martin, 980 F.2d 943,
952 (4th Cir. 1992); Eastern Shore Markets, Inc. v. J.D.
Assoc. Ltd. Partnership, 213 F.3d 175, 180 (4th Cir.
2000). A complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to
dismiss will survive if it contains “enough facts to
state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
(2007)); see also, Robinson v. American Honda
Motor Co., Inc., 551 F.3d 218, 222 (4th Cir. 2009).
“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff
pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of
action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not
Supreme Court has also opined that
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only
“a short and plain statement of the claim showing that
the pleader is entitled to relief.” Specific facts are
not necessary; the statement need only “‘give the
defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is and the
grounds upon which it rests.'” In addition, when
ruling on a defendant's motion to dismiss, a judge must
accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93-94 (2007)
(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555-56).
for the purposes of this motion to dismiss we must take all
the factual allegations in the complaint as true, we are not
bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a
factual allegation.” Papasan v. Allain, 478
U.S. 265, 286 (1986). The court “should view the
complaint in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff.” Mylan Labs, Inc. v. Matkar, 7 F.3d
1130, 1134 (4th Cir. 1993).
was employed by Defendant Prinston as a Quality Technician
II, who was responsible for ensuring the quality of
Prinston's pharmaceutical products. (Document No. 7, p.
3; Document No. 13, p. 1). Defendant contends that Plaintiff
was actually employed by Generics Bidco II LLC d/b/a Prinston
Laboratories. (Document No. 13, p. 1, ...