United States District Court, W.D. North Carolina, Charlotte Division
ORDER
David
C. Keesler, United States Magistrate Judge
THIS
MATTER IS BEFORE THE COURT “Plaintiff's
Motion For Summary on “Plaintiff's Motion For
Summary Judgment” (Document No. 11) and
“Defendant's Motion For Summary Judgment”
(Document No. 14). The parties have consented to Magistrate
Judge jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), and
these motions are ripe for disposition. After careful
consideration of the written arguments, the administrative
record, and applicable authority, the undersigned will direct
that “Plaintiff's Motion For Summary
Judgment” (Document No. 11) be denied; that
“Defendant's Motion For Summary Judgment”
(Document No. 14) be granted; and that the
Commissioner's decision be affirmed.
I.
BACKGROUND
In this
case, Plaintiff Rosa Camilla Ivey (“Plaintiff”),
through counsel, seeks judicial review of an unfavorable
administrative decision on her application for disability
benefits. (Document No. 1). On or about September 17, 2013,
Plaintiff filed applications for a period of disability and
disability insurance benefits (“DIB”) under Title
II of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405,
and for supplemental security income under Title XVI
of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1383, alleging
an inability to work due to a disabling condition beginning
April 26, 2013. (Transcript of the Record of Proceedings
(“Tr.”) 15, 241). The Commissioner of Social
Security (the “Commissioner” or
“Defendant”) denied Plaintiff's application
initially on or about March 20, 2014, and again after
reconsideration on or about August 1, 2014. (Tr. 15, 164,
173).
In its
“Notice of Reconsideration, ” the Social Security
Administration (“SSA”) included the following
explanation of its decision:
The medical evidence shows that your condition will not
remain severe enough for 12 continuous months to be
considered disabling. You are able to think, act in your own
interest, communicate, handle your own affairs, and adjust to
ordinary emotional stresses without significant difficulties.
Although the condition is severe, it is not expected to
remain disabling for at least twelve continuous months as the
law requires.
We do not have sufficient vocational information to determine
whether you will be able to perform any of your past relevant
work in the future. However, based on the evidence in file,
we have determined that you will be able to adjust to other
work.
It has been decided, therefore, that you are not disabled
according to the Social Security Act.
(Tr. 173).
Plaintiff
filed a timely written request for a hearing on August 29,
2014. (Tr. 15, 182). On October 12, 2016, Plaintiff appeared
and testified at a hearing before Administrative Law Judge
Susan Poulos (the “ALJ”). (Tr. 15, 36-65). In
addition, Brenda Cartwright, Ed.D., a vocational expert
(“VE”), and Lindsey Robison, one of
Plaintiff's attorneys, appeared at the hearing.
Id. Plaintiff amended her alleged onset date to
September 17, 2013. (Tr. 15, 64).
This is
not Plaintiff's first disability case. A prior
unfavorable decision was issued by a different ALJ on June
26, 2013, with regard to Plaintiff's prior Title II and
Title XVI claims that alleged disability beginning on January
1, 2010, which was not appealed. (Tr. 15, 69-77). The date of
the prior decision is before the amended alleged onset date
in this case. In that earlier case, the ALJ found that
Plaintiff had several severe impairments: chronic abdominal
pain secondary to a combination of gastritis and irritable
bowel syndrome; depression; and anxiety. (Tr. 71). The ALJ
found in that first case that Plaintiff was not disabled.
(Tr. 15, 77).
In this
case, the ALJ likewise issued an unfavorable decision on
February 15, 2017, denying Plaintiff's claim. (Tr.
15-30). On February 28, 2017, Plaintiff filed a request for
review of the ALJ's decision, which was denied by the
Appeals Council on December 13, 2017. (Tr. 1-3, 240). The ALJ
decision thus became the final decision of the Commissioner
when the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's review
request. (Tr. 1).
Plaintiff's
“Complaint” seeking a reversal of the ALJ's
determination was filed in this Court on February 13, 2018.
(Document No. 1). On August 13, 2018, the parties consented
to the Magistrate Judge jurisdiction in this matter.
(Document No. 13)
“Plaintiff's
Motion For Summary Judgment” (Document No. 11) and
“Plaintiff's Memorandum Of Law In Support Of A
Motion For Summary Judgment Pursuant To Fed.R.Civ.P.
56” (Document No. 12) were filed June 19, 2018.
“Defendant's Motion For Summary Judgment”
(Document No. 14) and “Memorandum Of Law In Support Of
Defendant's Motion For Summary Judgment” (Document
No. 15) were filed August 13, 2018. Plaintiff declined to
file a reply brief, and the time to do so has lapsed.
See Local Rule 7.2 (e).
Based
on the foregoing, the pending motions are now ripe for review
and disposition.
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The
Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) and §
1383(c)(3), limits this Court's review of a final
decision of the Commissioner to: (1) whether substantial
evidence supports the Commissioner's decision; and (2)
whether the Commissioner applied the correct legal standards.
Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 390 (1971);
Hays v. Sullivan, 907 F.2d 1453, 1456 (4th Cir.
1990).
The
Fourth Circuit has made clear that it is not for a reviewing
court to re-weigh the evidence or to substitute its judgment
for that of the Commissioner - so long as that decision is
supported by substantial evidence. Hays, 907 F.2d at
1456 (4th Cir. 1990); see also, Smith v.
Schweiker, 795 F.2d 343, 345 (4th Cir. 1986);
Hancock v. Astrue, 667 F.3d 470, 472 (4th Cir.
2012). “Substantial evidence has been defined as
‘more than a scintilla and [it] must do more than
create a suspicion of the existence of a fact to be
established. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.'” Smith v. Heckler, 782 F.2d
1176, 1179 (4th Cir. 1986) (quoting Perales, 402
U.S. at 401).
Ultimately,
it is the duty of the Commissioner, not the courts, to make
findings of fact and to resolve conflicts in the evidence.
Hays, 907 F.2d at 1456; King v. Califano,
599 F.2d 597, 599 (4th Cir. 1979) (“This court does not
find facts or try the case de novo when reviewing disability
determinations.”); Seacrist v. Weinberger, 538
F.2d 1054, 1056-57 (4th Cir. 1976) (“We note that it is
the responsibility of the [Commissioner] and not the courts
to reconcile inconsistences in the medical evidence, and that
it is the claimant who bears the risk of
nonpersuasion.”). Indeed, so long as the
Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial
evidence, it must be affirmed even if the reviewing court
disagrees with the final outcome. Lester v.
Schweiker, 683 F.2d 838, 841 (4th Cir. 1982).
III.
DISCUSSION
The
question before the ALJ was whether Plaintiff was under a
“disability” as that term of art is defined for
Social Security purposes, at any time between September 16,
2013, and the date her decision.[1] (Tr. 29). To establish
entitlement to benefits, Plaintiff has the burden of proving
that she was disabled within the meaning of the Social
Security Act. Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 146
n.5 (1987).
The
Social Security Administration has established a five-step
sequential evaluation process for determining if a person is
disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a). The five steps are:
(1) whether claimant is engaged in substantial gainful
activity -if yes, not disabled;
(2) whether claimant has a severe medically determinable
physical or mental impairment, or combination of impairments
that meet the duration requirement in § 404.1509 - if
no, not disabled;
(3) whether claimant has an impairment or combination of
impairments that meets or medically equals one of the
listings in appendix 1, and meets the duration requirement
-if yes, disabled;
(4) whether claimant has the residual functional capacity
(“RFC”) to perform her/his past relevant work -
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