United States District Court, W.D. North Carolina, Asheville Division
DONALD C. KORNSE, JR., Plaintiff,
v.
DENNIS LEE HOWELL (JUDGE), et al., Defendants.
ORDER
Martin
Reidinger United States District Judge
THIS
MATTER is before the Court sua sponte.
I.
BACKGROUND
The
Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
1983 against retired U.S. Magistrate Judge Dennis Lee Howell;
Assistant United States Attorney John D. Pritchard; the
owners and employees of Skyland Automotive Inc.; members of
the news media; Buncombe County Sheriff Van Duncan; and
several others, alleging violation of his civil rights
arising from his arrest and subsequent prosecution and
conviction for impersonating a federal officer. [Doc. 1, as
amended by Doc. 2]. Specifically, the Plaintiff alleges that
he was subjected to perjured testimony by federal agents,
malicious prosecution, false imprisonment, and false arrest.
[Id. at 18].[1] He also asserts claims of defamation and
libel. [Id.].
The
criminal prosecution referenced in the Plaintiff's
Complaint stems from a Bill of Indictment filed in this
District in April 2016, charging the Plaintiff with
impersonating a Department of Homeland Security officer, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 912. [Criminal No.
1:16-cr-00041-MR (“CR”), Doc. 1]. In November
2016, the Plaintiff was found guilty of this charge by a
jury. [CR Doc. 58]. On April 13, 2017, the Plaintiff was
sentenced to a term of time served, followed by one year of
supervised release. [CR Doc. 81]. The Plaintiff appealed [CR
Doc. 83], and the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed
his conviction and sentence on January 11, 2018. [CR Doc.
100].
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Because
the Plaintiff has paid the $400 fee associated with the
filing of this action, the statutory screening procedure
authorized under the in forma pauperis
statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), is not applicable.
Nevertheless, the Court has inherent authority to dismiss a
frivolous complaint sua sponte. See Ross v. Baron,
493 Fed.Appx. 405, 406 (4th Cir. 2012) (noting that
“frivolous complaints are subject to dismissal pursuant
to the inherent authority of the court, even when the filing
fee has been paid”) (citing Mallard v. United
States Dist. Ct. for S.D. of Iowa, 490 U.S. 296, 307-08
(1989)).
A
complaint is deemed frivolous “where it lacks an
arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke
v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325, 109 S.Ct. 827, 104
L.Ed.2d 338 (1989). “Legally frivolous claims are based
on an ‘indisputedly meritless legal theory' and
including ‘claims of infringement of a legal interest
which clearly does not exist.'” Adams v.
Rice, 40 F.3d 72, 75 (4th Cir. 1994). Claims are
“factually frivolous” if “the facts alleged
rise to the level of the irrational or the wholly
incredible.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25,
32-33 (1992).
III.
DISCUSSION
“[I]n
order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional
conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by
actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or
sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the
conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal,
expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state
tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called
into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of
habeas corpus….” Heck v. Humphrey, 512
U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994) (footnote omitted). “A claim
for damages bearing that relationship to a conviction or
sentence that has not been so invalidated is not
cognizable under § 1983.” Id. (emphasis
in original).
Here, a
judgment in the Plaintiff's favor on any of the claims
asserted under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for perjury, malicious
prosecution, false imprisonment, false arrest, and the like
would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction.
Thus, under Heck, the Plaintiff cannot assert these
claims unless he can show that his underlying conviction has
been reversed, expunged, or otherwise invalidated. It is
clear from the record of this Court, however, that the
Plaintiff's conviction is still valid and has not been
reversed or expunged. As these § 1983 claims are clearly
barred by Heck, the Court concludes that these
claims must be dismissed as frivolous.
The
Plaintiff also asserts claims for defamation and libel,
alleging that that his “good name was smeared by”
the Government, Skyland Automotive, and the local television
station, WLOS during the course of these criminal
proceedings. [Doc. 1 at 18]. The Plaintiff, however, does not
identify any specific defamatory statements, except to imply
that statements were made regarding his arrest and conviction
and that the employees of Skyland Automotive made false
accusations which led to his arrest. To the extent that these
allegedly defamatory statements relate to the Plaintiff's
arrest and conviction, such claims are also barred by
Heck. To the extent that any defamatory statements
are alleged to have been made that are not so barred, the
Plaintiff's allegations are so nebulous and lacking in a
factual foundation as to be frivolous. The Plaintiff's
claims sounding in defamation, therefore, are also dismissed.
While
the Plaintiff asserts a number of civil rights violations in
his Complaint, at no point does he specifically assert a
claim for deliberate indifference to medical needs while in
pretrial detention. Nevertheless, in two brief paragraphs of
the 21-page complaint, the Plaintiff alleges that while he
was held in custody from April 14-19, 2016, he was deprived
of medical prescriptions, which forced him into
detoxification and withdrawal. [Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 24,
56]. The Plaintiff, however, does not identify where he was
being held in custody or which parties allegedly deprived him
of such medication.[2] In fact, he provides no factual detail
regarding the circumstances under which he was deprived of
such medications. To state a claim for a constitutional
violation based on the failure to administer medication, the
Plaintiff must allege that the custodial authorities
displayed a deliberate indifference to his medical needs.
See Parrish ex rel. Lee v. Cleveland, 372 F.3d 294,
303 (4th Cir. 2004). To establish deliberate indifference,
the Plaintiff must allege “that the defendants actually
knew of and disregarded a substantial risk of serious injury
to the detainee or that they actually knew of and ignored a
detainee's serious need for medical care.”
Id. at 302 (citation omitted). The Plaintiff's
passing reference to his lack of access to medications while
in custody is hardly sufficient to support such a claim.
Thus, to the extent that the Complaint could liberally be
construed as asserting a claim of constitutional deprivation
based upon deliberate indifference to medical needs, the
Court will dismiss such claim without prejudice.
In sum,
the Plaintiff is barred by Heck from asserting any
claims that would necessarily imply the invalidity of his
conviction unless and until he can show that his underlying
conviction has been reversed, expunged, or otherwise
invalidated. Accordingly, the Plaintiff's claims under
ยง 1983 and for defamation related to statements made
about his arrest and conviction are dismissed. Further, to
the extent that the Plaintiff makes any other claims for
defamation or attempts to assert a claim for deliberate
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