United States District Court, E.D. North Carolina, Western Division
C. DEVER III UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
February 28, 2019, Randy Dingle ("Dingle" or
"plaintiff'), proceeding pro se, filed a complaint
against Talmages Baggett, Jr. ("Baggett"), Ellen B.
Hancox ("Hancox"), Ronnie Mitchell
("Mitchell"), Deputy Mickey Locklear
("Locklear"), the Cumberland County Detention
Center (the "Center"), Timothy J. Peterkin
("Peterkin"), Ennis W. Wright ("Wright"),
Deputy Murphy ("Murphy"), Lieutenant Morrison
("Morrison"), Deputy Walden ("Walden"),
Clavion Morning ("Morning"), and WilliamDancy
("Dancy"; collectively, "defendants")
[D.E. 7]. On April 11, 2019, Peterkin moved to dismiss
Dingle's complaint for failure to state a claim [D.E.
37]. On May 6, 2019, the Center, Locklear, Mitchell, Morning,
Morrison, Murphy, Walden, and Wright moved to dismiss for
lack of jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim [D.E.
42] and filed a memorandum in support [D.E. 43]. On May 8,
2019, Baggett and Hancox moved to dismiss on the same grounds
[D.E.46] and filed a memorandum in support [D.E. 47]. On May
9, 2019, Dancy moved to dismiss on the same grounds [D.E. 49]
and filed a memorandum in support [D.E. 49-1]. Dingle
responded in opposition to defendants' motions [D.E. 41,
54-56]. No. defendant replied. As explained below, the court
grants defendants' motions to dismiss for lack of
Dingle's complaint is not a model of clarity, Dingle
alleges that, on or about My 24, 2017, and August 20, 2018,
Dingle appeared before Baggett, then a state judge in
Cumberland County. See Compl. [D.E. 7] 6-7. Dingle alleges
that Baggett told Dingle that he would take Dingle's
residence, was upset about Dingle's clothing, and
threatened to hold Dingle in contempt of court for his
appearance. See Id. at 6-7. Dingle also alleges that
Baggett refused to look at a decree from a federal bankruptcy
judge that disallowed "Ditech Finance LLC" to
foreclose on Dingle's residence that Hancox, the Trial
Court Administrator for the Cumberland County courts,
presented to him. Id. at 6-7. Additionally, Dingle
alleges that Baggett and Hancox made various threatening
remarks to Dingle because he identifies as Moorish American.
See Id. at 7.
the hearing on August 20, 2018, Dingle alleges that Mitchell,
an attorney, asked Baggett to order Dingle's eviction.
See Id. Baggett ordered Sheriff Wright and
Lieutenant Morrison to evict Dingle and his wife, Patricia
Ellen Watson Dingle ("Patricia"; collectively, the
"Dingles"), from their residence. See Id.
On August 23, 2018, Deputy Locklear put an eviction notice on
the front door of the Dingles' "mobile home."
Id. On August 24, 2018, Dingle alleges that he went
to the Cumberland County Sheriff Department and showed
Lieutenant Morrison and Sergeant Morning the bankruptcy court
order disallowing foreclosure. See Id. at 7-8.
August 30, 2018, the Dingles went to the North Carolina
Division of Motor Vehicles ("DMV") to obtain
Patricia's driver license. Seeid, at 8. While there,
Dingle alleges that the "DMV officer" was rude and
told him to sit down. See Id. Dingle believes that
this occurred because Dancy told the other workers who
Patricia was when the Dingles entered. See Id.
Dingle alleges that Dancy is Patricia's
that day, as the Dingles prepared to leave their residence to
attend a family reunion, they heard banging noises. See
Id. While Dingle initially believed that someone was
breaking into his home, he soon realized that the police had
surrounded the home. See Id. Deputy Locklear
arrested Patricia and "patted and felt all over
her." Id. Deputy Murphy also patted down Dingle
and put them both in police cars while Deputy Walden,
Lieutenant Morrison, and several other unnamed deputies
allegedly "ransack[ed]" the Dingles' residence.
Id. Dingle alleges that Deputy Murphy threatened to
kill him, causing Dingle to "fear for [his]
life." Id. at 9. The police eventually took the
Dingles to the Center and put them both on bond for what
Dingle alleges are "senseless" criminal charges.
See id. at 8-9.
alleges that he has not seen Patricia since August 31, 2018,
because she left him for Dancy, who works as a part-time
security guard at the federal bankruptcy court. See
Id. at 9. Dingle also alleges that, on September 4,
2018, various individuals told him that "they"
would keep Patricia from him. Id. Additionally,
Dingle alleges that Peterkin, his attorney in the federal
bankruptcy court, "should have handle[d] this issue in
the Cumberland County courts" but "fail[ed] to do
so in a timely manner" even though he "understood
and knew that the house was paid for." Id. At
some point, Peterkin terminated his representation of Dingle.
seeks approximately $600 million in relief for claims
including "disrespect by a judge or officer of the
court," "unlawful arrest," "illegal
arrest (no warrant)," trespass, excessive bail, cruel
and unusual punishment, violation of Dingle's right to a
speedy trial, violation of Dingle's freedom of speech,
racketeering, and false imprisonment. Id. at 10; see
Id. at 6.
motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure tests subject-matter jurisdiction, which is
the court's "statutory or constitutional power to
adjudicate the case." Steel Co. v. Citizens for a
Better Env't,523 U.S. 83, 89 (1998) (emphasis
omitted); see Holloway v. Pagan River Dockside Seafood.
Inc., 669 F.3d 448, 453 (4th Cir. 2012); Constantine
v. Rectors & Visitors of George Mason Univ,. 411
F.3d 474, 479-80 (4th Cir. 2005). A federal court "must
determine that it has subject-matter jurisdiction over the
case before it can pass on the merits of that case."
Constantine. 411 F.3d at 479-80. As the party
invoking federal jurisdiction, Dingle bears the burden of
establishing that this court has subject-matter jurisdiction
in this action. See. e.g.. Steel Co., 523 U.S. at
104; Evans v. B.F. Perlrins fn., 166 F.3d 642, 647
(4th Cir. 1999); Richmond. Fredericksburg & Potomac
R.R. v. United States, 945 F.2d 765, 768 (4th Cir.
1991). In considering a motion to dismiss for lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction, the court may consider evidence
outside the pleadings without converting the motion into one
for summary judgment. See. e.g.. Evans, 166
F.3d at 647. A court should grant a motion to dismiss under
Rule 12(b)(1) "only if the material jurisdictional facts
are not in dispute and the moving party is entitled to
prevail as a matter of law." Id. (quotation
whether federal jurisdiction exists over Dingle's claims,
several defendants contend that Dingle's complaint does
not raise a federal question. See [D.E. 42, 46,
49]In his complaint, Dingle alleges that
"Title 18 [and] Title 31" provide the bases for
federal subject-matter jurisdiction. Compl. [D.E. 7] 5.
18 of the United States Code defines federal crimes and
federal criminal procedure. Title 31 of the United States
Code governs the United States Treasury, the federal budget,
and related matters. Neither Title 18 nor Title 31 provides
Dingle with an applicable federal cause of action. Moreover,
the parties are not diverse under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. See
Compl. [D.E. 7] 1-4. Thus, because Dingle has not met his
burden to show that the court has subject-matter jurisdiction
over his claims, the court dismisses Dingle's complaint
for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
to the extent that Dingle seeks to contest his eviction in
this court, the "Rooker-Feldman
doctrine applies to losers of state foreclosure
proceedings." Saimplice v. Ocwen Loan Servicing
Inc..368 F.Supp.3d 858, 864 (E.D. N.C. 2019); see, e,
g,, Locklear v. Fed. Home Mortg. Corp., No.
7:16-CV-344-D, 2017WL 1737634, at *3 (E.D. N.C. May 1, 2017)
(unpublished); Hardin v. Bank of Am.. N.A.. No.
7:16-CV-75-D, 2017 WL 44709, at *3 (E.D. N.C. Jan. 3, 2017)
(unpublished); Carmichael v. Irwin Mortg. Corp., No.
5:14-CV-122-D, 2014 WL 7205099, at *3 (E.D. N.C. Dec. 17,
2014) (unpublished); Radisi v. HSBC Bank U.S.A,
Nat'l Ass'n, No. 511CV125-RLV, 2012 WL 2155052,
at *4 (W.D. N.C. June 13, 2012) (unpublished), affd, 479
Fed.Appx. 468 (4th Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (unpublished). The
Rooker-Feldman doctrine reflects that
"federal district courts have 'no authority to
review final judgments of a state court injudicial
proceedings.'" Kaimplira, 358 F.Supp.3d at
863 (quoting D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460
U.S. 462, 482 (1983)); see Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi
Basic Indus. Corp..544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005); Rooker
v. Fid. Tr. Co.,263 ...