United States District Court, W.D. North Carolina, Asheville Division
Cogburn Jr. United States District Judge
MATTER is before the Court on defendant's Motion
Pursuant to Rule 59(e) Requesting District Court of Grant
Jail-Time Credit, (Doc. No. 168), and on the Government's
Motion to Dismiss Petitioner's Motion, (Doc. No. 171).
Defendant filed a pro se response to the motion to dismiss on
September 9, 2019.
BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
defendant's indictment for various drug and firearm
charges, the magistrate judge conducted a detention hearing
on November 25, 2016. (Doc. No. 160). At the hearing, both
parties agreed that defendant should be released to home
detention on a $25, 000 bond. (Id. at 11-12). The
Government requested that the Court allow the probation
office to use electronic monitoring if the probation office
determined such monitoring would be appropriate.
(Id.). When asked whether defendant “had any
problem with being on electronic monitoring, ” her
counsel replied that the only problem was getting a landline
installed, “[b]ut we would certainly like to have her
out, Your Honor.” (Id. at 12).
Government did not object to defendant being released before
installation of the electronic monitoring equipment, and this
Court allowed her release to home detention before the
installation of the equipment. (Id. at 13, 18). The
Court also allowed defendant to travel to Tennessee to visit
her grandfather with permission from the probation office.
(Id. at 15). Defendant was allowed to leave her
residence for “employment, education, religious
services, medical, substance abuse, mental health treatment,
attorney visits, court appearances, court ordered
obligations, or other activities that are pre-approved by the
office of probation and pretrial services.”
(Id. at 18).
defendant's conviction by a jury of four charges, this
Court sentenced her to 60 months of imprisonment. (Doc. No.
139). The Fourth Circuit affirmed her conviction. United
States v. Yates, 746 Fed.Appx. 162 (4th Cir.),
petition for cert. denied, 139 S.Ct. 616 (2018). In
July 2019, defendant filed the pending motion, arguing that
her release to home detention “was extremely
restrictive” and, accordingly, she should receive
jail-time credit for the six months and one week that she was
on home detention. (Doc. No. 168 at 1-2). On August 6, 2019,
this Court ordered the Government to submit a brief
addressing defendant's motion. (Doc. No. 169). On August
15, 2019, the Government filed a motion to dismiss
argues that she should receive credit for the time that she
spent on home detention before she was tried and convicted.
Defendant contends that she cannot seek relief from the
Bureau of Prisons because this Court deprived her of her
right to due process by not advising her that the time spent
on home detention would not be credited against her sentence
of imprisonment. (Doc. No. 168 at 2). Because of this alleged
lack of notice, she argues that she must be given credit for
her time in home detention. (Id. at 3). She also
argues that 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b) is unconstitutionally
vague and that she did not intelligently elect bail.
(Id. at 4). For the following reasons, the motion
will be dismissed.
there is no “Rule 59(e)” in the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure. Defendant's motion appears to be a
reference to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e), which
provides that in a civil case a motion to alter or amend a
judgment may be made within 28 days after entry of the
judgment. Defendant's motion would be untimely under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e). More importantly, she
cannot use the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to challenge
her sentence in a criminal case. See United States v.
Leake, 96 Fed.Appx. 873, at *1 (4th Cir. 2004).
Accordingly, defendant's motion is not cognizable under
Rule 59(e), and she has not presented a basis for this
Court's jurisdiction over the motion.
defendant has not shown that she has exhausted her
administrative remedies. Defendant is requesting a
determination of time-credit on the sentence that this Court
imposed. It is the province of the Attorney General, acting
through the Bureau of Prisons, to give a defendant credit for
the time spent in federal custody before sentencing.
See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(b); United States v.
Wilson, 503 U.S. 329, 333-35 (1992); Harris v.
United States, 2015 WL 8366822, at *4 (W.D. N.C. Dec. 8,
2015). Prisoners must exhaust administrative remedies before
seeking review of time credit calculations in court. See
Wilson, 503 U.S. at 335. Defendant has not shown that
she has exhausted her administrative remedies by presenting
this claim to the Bureau of Prisons. See Carswell v.
O'Brien, 2009 WL 5178372, at *1 (W.D. Va. Dec. 29,
2009) (dismissing § 2241 petition raising time credit
claim for failure to exhaust administrative remedies); Doc.
No. 168 at 2.
this Court lacks jurisdiction to address defendant's
claim under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Errors challenging the
execution of a sentence, rather than the sentence's
validity, must be filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 in the
petitioner's district of confinement. United States
v. Little, 392 F.3d 671, 679-80 (4th Cir. 2004); §
2241(a). A “request for sentencing credit is properly
brought under § 2241, ” even if the basis for the
challenge is constitutional. Little, 392 F.3d at
679. Because defendant is incarcerated in West Virginia, this
Court would lack jurisdiction over defendant's motion
even if the Court were to construe it as a § 2241
petition. See United States v. Poole, 531 F.3d 263,
270-71, 274-75 (4th Cir. 2008) (holding that a district court
lacks jurisdiction to address a § 2241 petition that is
not brought in the district of the petitioner's immediate
even if this Court could consider the merits of
defendant's motion, her claim lacks merit. In Reno v.
Koray, 515 U.S. 50, 57, 63 (1995), the Supreme Court
held that “a defendant suffers ‘detention'
only when committed to the custody of the Attorney General,
” and that a defendant who is released on bail, even if
subject to restriction conditions, is not detained. In
Reno the defendant had been committed to a community
treatment center and was only allowed to leave if granted
authorization and accompanied by a Government special agent.
Id. at 52-53. The Court stated that “[i]t
would be anomalous to interpret § 3585(b) to require
sentence credit for time spent confined in a community
treatment center where the defendant is not subject to
BOP's control, since Congress generally views such a
restriction on liberty” not as a sentence of
imprisonment, but rather as a term of probation or supervised
release. Id. at 59. Because defendant was on home
detention, rather than in the custody of the Attorney
General, she is not entitled to credit for her time on
pre-trial home confinement. See United States v.
Piper, 525 Fed.Appx. 205, 209-10 (3rd Cir. 2013)
(holding “home detention as a condition of bail cannot
be credited as time served”); Randall v.
Whelan, 938 F.2d 522, 525 (4th Cir. 1991) (denying
credit for time spent in drug rehabilitation center and
recognizing the presumption that “‘custody'
refers to the legal authority of the custodian rather than to
actual housing conditions”); United States v.
Insley, 927 F.2d 185, 186 (4th Cir. 1991) (rejecting
claim that defendant should have received time credit for
time she spent while on appeal bond, which included
due process claim also lacks merit because her contention
that she had a liberty interest in starting a potential
future sentence early is too speculative and insubstantial to
merit due process protection. See Cucciniello v.
Keller, 137 F.3d 721, 724 (2d Cir. 1998) (rejecting due
process claim and holding that at the time a pretrial
detainee elects home confinement, it is entirely speculative
whether she will be convicted, so no protected liberty
interest is impaired); Barreto v. Jeter, 249
Fed.Appx. 986, 987 (5th Cir. 2007) (rejecting ...